Mercenaires & sociétés militaires privées au service du marché, de Xavier Renou
Publié par Survie et Agir Ici
Présentation :
La marchandisation s’étend désormais au domaine de la « violence légitime », un secteur en plein essor qui représenterait déjà un bénéfice annuel de plus de 100 milliards de dollars.
Les mercenaires de jadis sont aujourd’hui les employés de « sociétés militaires privées » parfaitement légales qui, renvoyant à un passé révolu l’image sulfureuse des « chiens de guerre », tentent de se construire un rôle respectable dans la fiction d’un marché dispensateur de paix et de démocratie. Elles proposent pourtant à leurs clients (États, firmes multinationales, mouvements armés divers) les habituelles prestations d’ordre militaire : opérations de déstabilisation, combat, conseil en stratégie, logistique, etc. C’est ainsi, par exemple, qu’une firme dont la mission officielle de « formation à la transition démocratique » conduit au bombardement de civils recevra la bénédiction aussi bien de son client que des instances de contrôle.
Parce qu’elles font pleinement jouer le mécanisme de circulation entre les secteurs militaires privé et public - l’une d’elles a recruté successivement l’ancien secrétaire à la Défense de Ronald Reagan, l’ancien secrétaire d’État James Baker et l’ancien président des États-Unis George Bush père -, les sociétés mercenaires influent de plus en plus sur les politiques de « défense ».
Parce qu’elles se mettent au service des multinationales qui exploitent les pays du Sud dotés en ressources minières, ces sociétés agissent comme les gardiens d’un ordre économique qui maintient dans la plus grande dépendance des pays en principe libérés depuis plusieurs décennies du joug colonial.
Les sociétés militaires privées seraient-elles l’instrument privilégié du retour de l’impérialisme ?
Chercheur en sciences politiques, Xavier Renou est responsable de la campagne « Désarmement nucléaire » de Greenpeace France.
Posts tonen met het label AFRICA. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label AFRICA. Alle posts tonen
woensdag 6 februari 2008
Subsidy cuts boost Africa’s sugar producers
Ben Zwinkels
The European Union agriculture ministers have recently agreed to cut the prices offered to European sugar farmers by 36 percent, bringing the European Union sugar rules into line with global frameworks. African sugarcane producers are among the first beneficiaries.
This change was demanded of the European Union after the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled earlier this year that its existing 40-year-old guaranteed pricing system was illegal. The WTO's judgement followed a formal complaint from Sugar Cane Producing Countries. Countries like Australia, Brazil and Thailand will now benefit from a reduction in subsidised European sugar on the global marketplace, along with other smaller sugar producing countries in Africa like Uganda, Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya.
In the past international campaigning groups for poor countries have highlighted many times the absurdities of agricultural subsidies, by focusing on those for sugar, a product that developing countries are especially good at producing.
The sugarcane raw material generates sugar, anhydrous alcohol (a gasoline additive) and hydrated alcohol for the internal and external markets, with different price and demand dynamics. Supplying these markets without significant variations requires planning and management efforts.
Over centuries, this had been carried out by local governments, starting in the decade of the 90's, in a process that was concluded in 1999, responsibility was totally transferred to the private sector, and what exists today is a free market system without subsidies, where sugar and alcohol prices are set according to variations in supply and demand. Sugarcane prices are set according to raw material quality, to prices effectively obtained by the final producers and their percentage participation in the products' final price.
Brazil is the largest world sugarcane producer, followed by India and Australia. On average, 55% of Brazilian sugarcane becomes alcohol and 45% sugar. The sugarcane plant offers one of the most cost-effective renewable resources among those renewable energy options that are readily available in developing countries.
It is a highly efficient converter of solar energy and, in fact, has the highest energy-to-volume ratio among energy crops. It is a highly diversified resource, offering alternatives for production of food, feed, fibre and energy. Such flexibility is valuable in the developing world where fluctuations in commodity prices and weather conditions can cause severe economic hardships.
It is expected that the abolished subsidies by the European Union on European sugar farmers will lead to more production of sugar cane in the developing countries, especially in Africa. International sugar prices are ruling now around USD 350 a tonne, which is good news for sugar mills also in Africa.
The Ugandan sugarcane production for example is already since a long time an important crop. One of the leading companies in the sugarcane industry in Uganda now is the Madhvani Group, which started the Kakira Sugar Works in 1940 near the pristine shores of Lake Victoria.
The creator of the Karika Sugar Works was the Indian Muljibhai Prabhudas Madhvani, a man with great vision, who settled himself in 1912 in Jinja in Uganda. With little more than brains and an outgoing personality, he set up his own trading concern - his first step into a business that would later account for 10% of Uganda's GDP.
Nowadays Kakira Sugar Works is a successful sugar cane plantation of 9.500 ha with a workforce of 7.500 staff and workers. The company cooperates with over 4.000 out growing farmers supplying sugar cane to the factory. The social infrastructure includes staff housing, electrical distribution systems, roads, a hospital and 12 schools for employees’ children.
With the abolished subsidies on sugar in Europe more possibilities will be created for Africa Sugar Cane companies. Kakira Sugar Works is already working on a major expansion programme in order to increase out growers land under cane to 13.000 hectares - with subsequent expansion to 18,000 hectares in the next 2-3 years.
In this respect the Madhvani Group will contribute substantially to guiding the out growers with initial seeds, crop cultivation and harvest methods. All this will lead to an annual increase of more than 160.000 tons of sugar.
On the processing site Kakira Sugar Works is actually realising an important investment in the modernisation of the production plant and is creating a co -generation capacity of 21 MW of electricity, which will be delivered to the National Grid on a 24 hours/day basis.
Co -generation capacity will be possible by using “bagasse”, which is a by-product of the processing plant and creates now a substantial added value by producing electricity for at least two middle sized towns in Uganda. The Madhvani Group in Uganda can be proud of their constant efforts in developing the private sector in that country and in creating local knowledge for sustainable growth and ownership.
The absurdities of agricultural subsidies on sugar in Europe have shown that the system obstructed the African agricultural development. With the new policy in hand Africa is now able to become a real player in the international agricultural business.
Ben Zwinkels is a Senior Investment Officer of the Equity Department at the Netherlands Development Finance Company FMO
The European Union agriculture ministers have recently agreed to cut the prices offered to European sugar farmers by 36 percent, bringing the European Union sugar rules into line with global frameworks. African sugarcane producers are among the first beneficiaries.
This change was demanded of the European Union after the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled earlier this year that its existing 40-year-old guaranteed pricing system was illegal. The WTO's judgement followed a formal complaint from Sugar Cane Producing Countries. Countries like Australia, Brazil and Thailand will now benefit from a reduction in subsidised European sugar on the global marketplace, along with other smaller sugar producing countries in Africa like Uganda, Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya.
In the past international campaigning groups for poor countries have highlighted many times the absurdities of agricultural subsidies, by focusing on those for sugar, a product that developing countries are especially good at producing.
The sugarcane raw material generates sugar, anhydrous alcohol (a gasoline additive) and hydrated alcohol for the internal and external markets, with different price and demand dynamics. Supplying these markets without significant variations requires planning and management efforts.
Over centuries, this had been carried out by local governments, starting in the decade of the 90's, in a process that was concluded in 1999, responsibility was totally transferred to the private sector, and what exists today is a free market system without subsidies, where sugar and alcohol prices are set according to variations in supply and demand. Sugarcane prices are set according to raw material quality, to prices effectively obtained by the final producers and their percentage participation in the products' final price.
Brazil is the largest world sugarcane producer, followed by India and Australia. On average, 55% of Brazilian sugarcane becomes alcohol and 45% sugar. The sugarcane plant offers one of the most cost-effective renewable resources among those renewable energy options that are readily available in developing countries.
It is a highly efficient converter of solar energy and, in fact, has the highest energy-to-volume ratio among energy crops. It is a highly diversified resource, offering alternatives for production of food, feed, fibre and energy. Such flexibility is valuable in the developing world where fluctuations in commodity prices and weather conditions can cause severe economic hardships.
It is expected that the abolished subsidies by the European Union on European sugar farmers will lead to more production of sugar cane in the developing countries, especially in Africa. International sugar prices are ruling now around USD 350 a tonne, which is good news for sugar mills also in Africa.
The Ugandan sugarcane production for example is already since a long time an important crop. One of the leading companies in the sugarcane industry in Uganda now is the Madhvani Group, which started the Kakira Sugar Works in 1940 near the pristine shores of Lake Victoria.
The creator of the Karika Sugar Works was the Indian Muljibhai Prabhudas Madhvani, a man with great vision, who settled himself in 1912 in Jinja in Uganda. With little more than brains and an outgoing personality, he set up his own trading concern - his first step into a business that would later account for 10% of Uganda's GDP.
Nowadays Kakira Sugar Works is a successful sugar cane plantation of 9.500 ha with a workforce of 7.500 staff and workers. The company cooperates with over 4.000 out growing farmers supplying sugar cane to the factory. The social infrastructure includes staff housing, electrical distribution systems, roads, a hospital and 12 schools for employees’ children.
With the abolished subsidies on sugar in Europe more possibilities will be created for Africa Sugar Cane companies. Kakira Sugar Works is already working on a major expansion programme in order to increase out growers land under cane to 13.000 hectares - with subsequent expansion to 18,000 hectares in the next 2-3 years.
In this respect the Madhvani Group will contribute substantially to guiding the out growers with initial seeds, crop cultivation and harvest methods. All this will lead to an annual increase of more than 160.000 tons of sugar.
On the processing site Kakira Sugar Works is actually realising an important investment in the modernisation of the production plant and is creating a co -generation capacity of 21 MW of electricity, which will be delivered to the National Grid on a 24 hours/day basis.
Co -generation capacity will be possible by using “bagasse”, which is a by-product of the processing plant and creates now a substantial added value by producing electricity for at least two middle sized towns in Uganda. The Madhvani Group in Uganda can be proud of their constant efforts in developing the private sector in that country and in creating local knowledge for sustainable growth and ownership.
The absurdities of agricultural subsidies on sugar in Europe have shown that the system obstructed the African agricultural development. With the new policy in hand Africa is now able to become a real player in the international agricultural business.
Ben Zwinkels is a Senior Investment Officer of the Equity Department at the Netherlands Development Finance Company FMO
dinsdag 8 januari 2008
FRANCE-AFRIQUE
Last year when the French presidential elections were on everyone's mind, the organisation SURVIE published the follwing statement
POUR UNE POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE EN AFRIQUE RESPONSABLE ET TRANSPARENTE
Nous demandons aux partis politiques de s’engager :
• en faveur d’une politique de coopération avec l’Afrique respectant :
l’état de droit et les aspirations démocratiques,
les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels des peuples,
de la souveraineté économique, politique et militaire des États reconnus par leur population,
les dynamiques régionales et continentales afrcaines ;
• en faveur d’un contrôle parlementaire et citoyen de la politique française en Afrique afin qu’elle ne puisse plus être confisquée par une minorité d’acteurs politiques et économiques. Nous demandons que soit mise en place une commission parlementaire chargée de réaliser un bilan des politiques françaises en Afrique en auditionnant experts, responsables politiques, économiques et associatifs ;
• pour que la France défende plus activement les intérêts africains au sein des institutions internationales.
LE CONTEXTE
Plus de quarante ans après les indépendances, le bilan de la politique de la France en Afrique, tant au plan économique, politique que militaire, est contesté par ses bénéficiaires supposés. A part quelques expériences positives (notamment certaines réalisations dans le domaine de la coopération technique) et bien qu’ayant fait l’objet de réformes institutionnelles, cette politique n’ pas toujours servi les objectifs de développement, de soutien à la démocratie et à la paix, affichés parfois ostensiblement. Décidées dans l’opacité, sans contrôle parlementaire et citoyen, les interventions de l’Etat français en Afrique (financées par les contribuables) ont surtout servi les intérêts, parfois contradictoires, de minorités économiques ou politiques, en France comme en Afrique (les « réseaux de la Françafrique »). Du fait de son manque de cohérence et de transparence, il apparaît aujourd’hui nécessaire de refonder cette politique sur des bases plus conformes aux aspirations des populations africaines et des citoyens français.
LES ARGUMENTS
LA DIPLOMATIE FRANÇAISE A SOUVENT BLOQUÉ L’ÉMERGENCE DES SOCIÉTÉS CIVILES AFRICAINES en soutenant sans modération des régimes contestés par leurs peuples, favorisant de nombreuses situations de crises politiques et de guerres. Le soutien au régime génocidaire au Rwanda, la crise de succession au Togo ou la dérive du clan Déby au Tchad ont montré la situation d’impasse à laquelle mène une « diplomatie de la stabilité » qui ne fait qu’aggraver les facteurs de tensions. La France doit réellement conditionner son appui au respect de l’État de droit et encourager fortement les États mettant en place des systèmes de gouvernance démocratique et investissant dans des programmes sociaux (éducation, santé, eau, logement, transport). Elle doit mettre un terme à une diplomatie fondée sur des amitiés personnelles en instaurant des règles de protocole plus strictes et en révisant la nature et les fonctions des groupes d’amitié parlementaires. Elle doit également contribuer efficacement aux processus démocratiques en ne cautionnant plus des élections organisées sans contrôle efficace et en favorisant une supervision par l’ONU de tout processus électoral « à risque ».
LE DÉFICIT DE SOUVERAINETÉ EMPÊCHE LES RÉGIMES AFRICAINS LES PLUS VOLONTARISTES DE PRÉSIDER EFFICACEMENT AUX DESTINÉES DE LEUR NATION. Il est criant dans le domaine financier (poids de la dette) et monétaire, dans la zone CFA. Le lancement d’un plan de transfert progressif de souveraineté monétaire aux institutions régionales, chargées de se prononcer sur le maintien ou non de cette unité monétaire, devrait donc être envisagé. Au niveau économique, le respect de la souveraineté passe par un encadrement plus strict des interventions des multinationales françaises, notamment en matière d’extraction de matières premières, de délégations de services publics (eau, communications, transport). Cet encadrement doit être formalisé sur la base de règles de procédures et de transparence à valeur contraignante. Sur le plan de la souveraineté militaire, la suspension des interventions armées unilatérales de la France en Afrique sans mandat de l’ONU et la fermeture des bases militaires françaises, à l’exception de celles prévues dans le cadre du renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP), doivent être envisagées.
L’ENCHEVÊTREMENT DES LIEUX DE DÉCISIONS DE LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE AVEC UNE PLACE CENTRALE DE L’ÉLYSÉE (qui en a fait son domaine réservé notamment à travers sa « cellule africaine »), montre l’extrême nécessité que la politique extérieure de la France soit aujourd’hui soumise aux règles élémentaires de démocratie. Cela doit commencer par un rôle accru et effectif du Parlement en matière de coopération économique et financière, mais aussi de coopération militaire.
LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE S’INSCRIT AUJOURD’HUI DANS UN CONTEXTE D’INTERVENTIONS CROISSANTES D’ACTEURS MULTILATÉRAUX SUR LE CONTINENT. Grâce à son influence diplomatique au sein de l’ONU, de l’UE et son poids financier au sein des institutions financières internationales, la France est en mesure de défendre des politiques de coopération multilatérales plus efficaces en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté et moins soumises à l’orthodoxie néolibérale, ce qu’elle a très peu fait par le passé. Il s’agit également de permettre aux Etats africains d’acquérir plus de poids dans la défense de leurs intérêts. En matière diplomatique, domaine dans lequel l’influence de la France s’exerce le plus fortement, il est souhaitable de mettre un terme à la politique du « domaine réservé » que la diplomatie française tente d’imposer au sein de l’Union européenne ou de l’ONU dès lors qu’il s’agit de l’Afrique francophone, avec des objectifs souvent éloignés des revendications des peuples africains.
POUR UNE POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE EN AFRIQUE RESPONSABLE ET TRANSPARENTE
Nous demandons aux partis politiques de s’engager :
• en faveur d’une politique de coopération avec l’Afrique respectant :
l’état de droit et les aspirations démocratiques,
les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels des peuples,
de la souveraineté économique, politique et militaire des États reconnus par leur population,
les dynamiques régionales et continentales afrcaines ;
• en faveur d’un contrôle parlementaire et citoyen de la politique française en Afrique afin qu’elle ne puisse plus être confisquée par une minorité d’acteurs politiques et économiques. Nous demandons que soit mise en place une commission parlementaire chargée de réaliser un bilan des politiques françaises en Afrique en auditionnant experts, responsables politiques, économiques et associatifs ;
• pour que la France défende plus activement les intérêts africains au sein des institutions internationales.
LE CONTEXTE
Plus de quarante ans après les indépendances, le bilan de la politique de la France en Afrique, tant au plan économique, politique que militaire, est contesté par ses bénéficiaires supposés. A part quelques expériences positives (notamment certaines réalisations dans le domaine de la coopération technique) et bien qu’ayant fait l’objet de réformes institutionnelles, cette politique n’ pas toujours servi les objectifs de développement, de soutien à la démocratie et à la paix, affichés parfois ostensiblement. Décidées dans l’opacité, sans contrôle parlementaire et citoyen, les interventions de l’Etat français en Afrique (financées par les contribuables) ont surtout servi les intérêts, parfois contradictoires, de minorités économiques ou politiques, en France comme en Afrique (les « réseaux de la Françafrique »). Du fait de son manque de cohérence et de transparence, il apparaît aujourd’hui nécessaire de refonder cette politique sur des bases plus conformes aux aspirations des populations africaines et des citoyens français.
LES ARGUMENTS
LA DIPLOMATIE FRANÇAISE A SOUVENT BLOQUÉ L’ÉMERGENCE DES SOCIÉTÉS CIVILES AFRICAINES en soutenant sans modération des régimes contestés par leurs peuples, favorisant de nombreuses situations de crises politiques et de guerres. Le soutien au régime génocidaire au Rwanda, la crise de succession au Togo ou la dérive du clan Déby au Tchad ont montré la situation d’impasse à laquelle mène une « diplomatie de la stabilité » qui ne fait qu’aggraver les facteurs de tensions. La France doit réellement conditionner son appui au respect de l’État de droit et encourager fortement les États mettant en place des systèmes de gouvernance démocratique et investissant dans des programmes sociaux (éducation, santé, eau, logement, transport). Elle doit mettre un terme à une diplomatie fondée sur des amitiés personnelles en instaurant des règles de protocole plus strictes et en révisant la nature et les fonctions des groupes d’amitié parlementaires. Elle doit également contribuer efficacement aux processus démocratiques en ne cautionnant plus des élections organisées sans contrôle efficace et en favorisant une supervision par l’ONU de tout processus électoral « à risque ».
LE DÉFICIT DE SOUVERAINETÉ EMPÊCHE LES RÉGIMES AFRICAINS LES PLUS VOLONTARISTES DE PRÉSIDER EFFICACEMENT AUX DESTINÉES DE LEUR NATION. Il est criant dans le domaine financier (poids de la dette) et monétaire, dans la zone CFA. Le lancement d’un plan de transfert progressif de souveraineté monétaire aux institutions régionales, chargées de se prononcer sur le maintien ou non de cette unité monétaire, devrait donc être envisagé. Au niveau économique, le respect de la souveraineté passe par un encadrement plus strict des interventions des multinationales françaises, notamment en matière d’extraction de matières premières, de délégations de services publics (eau, communications, transport). Cet encadrement doit être formalisé sur la base de règles de procédures et de transparence à valeur contraignante. Sur le plan de la souveraineté militaire, la suspension des interventions armées unilatérales de la France en Afrique sans mandat de l’ONU et la fermeture des bases militaires françaises, à l’exception de celles prévues dans le cadre du renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP), doivent être envisagées.
L’ENCHEVÊTREMENT DES LIEUX DE DÉCISIONS DE LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE AVEC UNE PLACE CENTRALE DE L’ÉLYSÉE (qui en a fait son domaine réservé notamment à travers sa « cellule africaine »), montre l’extrême nécessité que la politique extérieure de la France soit aujourd’hui soumise aux règles élémentaires de démocratie. Cela doit commencer par un rôle accru et effectif du Parlement en matière de coopération économique et financière, mais aussi de coopération militaire.
LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE S’INSCRIT AUJOURD’HUI DANS UN CONTEXTE D’INTERVENTIONS CROISSANTES D’ACTEURS MULTILATÉRAUX SUR LE CONTINENT. Grâce à son influence diplomatique au sein de l’ONU, de l’UE et son poids financier au sein des institutions financières internationales, la France est en mesure de défendre des politiques de coopération multilatérales plus efficaces en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté et moins soumises à l’orthodoxie néolibérale, ce qu’elle a très peu fait par le passé. Il s’agit également de permettre aux Etats africains d’acquérir plus de poids dans la défense de leurs intérêts. En matière diplomatique, domaine dans lequel l’influence de la France s’exerce le plus fortement, il est souhaitable de mettre un terme à la politique du « domaine réservé » que la diplomatie française tente d’imposer au sein de l’Union européenne ou de l’ONU dès lors qu’il s’agit de l’Afrique francophone, avec des objectifs souvent éloignés des revendications des peuples africains.
Françafrique in brief
(Text by François-Xavier VERSCHAVE, president of Survie from 1995 to 2005)
This brief summary is based on an article published in a special dossier of the review Mouvements ("Movements", May 2002), "De la Françafrique à la mafiafrique" ("From Françafrique to mafiafrique"). My main works on the subject are La Françafrique (Stock, 1999), Noir silence ("Black silence") and Noir Chirac ("Black Chirac") (les arènes, 2000 and 2002), and L’envers de la dette ("The other side of the debt", Agone, 2001).
At the beginning of 1994 I coined the term "Françafrique" to describe the tip of the iceberg that is Franco-African relations, and went on to develop this concept in approximately twenty books and special reports. Here, briefly, I shall explain what the term refers to : the secret criminality in the upper echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden from view.
In 1960, events forced De Gaulle to grant independence to the French colonies of black Africa. This newly-proclaimed international legality was the unsullied tip of the iceberg : France as the best friend of Africa, development and democracy. Meanwhile, Jacques Foccart, "the man in the shadows", was given the task of maintaining dependence, using inevitably illegal, secret and shameful methods. He selected heads of state who were "friends of France" - through war (more than 100 000 civilians massacred in Cameroon from 1956 on ; the Madagascan resistance was broken in 1947 by carnage of a similar magnitude), assassination or electoral fraud. To these guardians of the neo-colonial order, Paris offered a share of the income from raw materials and development aid. Military bases, the CFA franc which could be exchanged in Switzerland, the secret services and the outwardly-innocent businesses acting on their behalf (Elf and numerous supply or "security" companies) completed the system.
And so began forty years of pillage, support for dictatorships, dirty tricks and secret wars - from Biafra to the two Congos. Rwanda, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo and others will bear the scars for many years to come. Gorged, burnt-out dictators, up to their eyeballs in debt, could no longer promise development, and so they brandished their final weapon, the ethnic scapegoat : "If I prolong my power, by using my clan and playing on ethnic divisions, it’s only to stop your enemies from the other ethnic group replacing me. Let’s exclude them as a preventative measure." We know what happened next, in many countries : a headlong flight into political criminality to consolidate economic criminality.
"Françafrique", also means "France à fric" (1). Over the course of four decades, hundreds of thousands of euros misappropriated from debt, aid, oil, cocoa... or drained through French importing monopolies, have financed French political-business networks (all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network), shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions.
Undermined in 1990 by the growth in democracy and "Sovereign national conferences", Françafrique very quickly came up with an arsenal of constitutional manipulation and ballot rigging which enabled it to transform the massive electoral rejection of dictatorships into approval. This double talk (French aid finances the elections ; French networks reverse the results) had a profoundly debilitating effect and resulted in the legitimisation of dictatorships in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, Djibouti, the Comoros and the Congos...
With "Angolagate" and such people as Pierre Falcone or Arcadi Gaydamak, we are seeing the beginnings of globalised management of the flows of unofficial money come from the predation of raw materials, from debt fraud and from arms-sales commissions - under the "control" of the secret services. The financial layers generated in this way, sheltered in tax havens, are beginning to interconnect ; the networks and treasures of Françafrique are connecting to those of their American, British, Russian, Israeli, Brazilian, etc. counterparts. In short, we are witnessing Françafrique gradually joining a mafiafrique.
François-Xavier Verschave
(1) "Fric" means "cash".
This brief summary is based on an article published in a special dossier of the review Mouvements ("Movements", May 2002), "De la Françafrique à la mafiafrique" ("From Françafrique to mafiafrique"). My main works on the subject are La Françafrique (Stock, 1999), Noir silence ("Black silence") and Noir Chirac ("Black Chirac") (les arènes, 2000 and 2002), and L’envers de la dette ("The other side of the debt", Agone, 2001).
At the beginning of 1994 I coined the term "Françafrique" to describe the tip of the iceberg that is Franco-African relations, and went on to develop this concept in approximately twenty books and special reports. Here, briefly, I shall explain what the term refers to : the secret criminality in the upper echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden from view.
In 1960, events forced De Gaulle to grant independence to the French colonies of black Africa. This newly-proclaimed international legality was the unsullied tip of the iceberg : France as the best friend of Africa, development and democracy. Meanwhile, Jacques Foccart, "the man in the shadows", was given the task of maintaining dependence, using inevitably illegal, secret and shameful methods. He selected heads of state who were "friends of France" - through war (more than 100 000 civilians massacred in Cameroon from 1956 on ; the Madagascan resistance was broken in 1947 by carnage of a similar magnitude), assassination or electoral fraud. To these guardians of the neo-colonial order, Paris offered a share of the income from raw materials and development aid. Military bases, the CFA franc which could be exchanged in Switzerland, the secret services and the outwardly-innocent businesses acting on their behalf (Elf and numerous supply or "security" companies) completed the system.
And so began forty years of pillage, support for dictatorships, dirty tricks and secret wars - from Biafra to the two Congos. Rwanda, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo and others will bear the scars for many years to come. Gorged, burnt-out dictators, up to their eyeballs in debt, could no longer promise development, and so they brandished their final weapon, the ethnic scapegoat : "If I prolong my power, by using my clan and playing on ethnic divisions, it’s only to stop your enemies from the other ethnic group replacing me. Let’s exclude them as a preventative measure." We know what happened next, in many countries : a headlong flight into political criminality to consolidate economic criminality.
"Françafrique", also means "France à fric" (1). Over the course of four decades, hundreds of thousands of euros misappropriated from debt, aid, oil, cocoa... or drained through French importing monopolies, have financed French political-business networks (all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network), shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions.
Undermined in 1990 by the growth in democracy and "Sovereign national conferences", Françafrique very quickly came up with an arsenal of constitutional manipulation and ballot rigging which enabled it to transform the massive electoral rejection of dictatorships into approval. This double talk (French aid finances the elections ; French networks reverse the results) had a profoundly debilitating effect and resulted in the legitimisation of dictatorships in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, Djibouti, the Comoros and the Congos...
With "Angolagate" and such people as Pierre Falcone or Arcadi Gaydamak, we are seeing the beginnings of globalised management of the flows of unofficial money come from the predation of raw materials, from debt fraud and from arms-sales commissions - under the "control" of the secret services. The financial layers generated in this way, sheltered in tax havens, are beginning to interconnect ; the networks and treasures of Françafrique are connecting to those of their American, British, Russian, Israeli, Brazilian, etc. counterparts. In short, we are witnessing Françafrique gradually joining a mafiafrique.
François-Xavier Verschave
(1) "Fric" means "cash".
woensdag 14 november 2007
Réunion panafricaine des chefs de sécurité à Kigali
Christophe Casalegno
06/11/2007 11:57 am
Kigali, Rwanda (PANA) – Les chefs de sécurité et de renseignement en provenance de 46 pays africains regroupés au sein d’une structure régionale dénommée Security services of Africa (CISSA), se trouvent depuis deux jours à Kigali pour une réunion de consultation d’une semaine.
La rencontre devra être focalisée sur les enjeux ainsi que de nouvelles stratégies à adopter pour combattre le génocide et participer aux différentes missions de maintien de la paix à travers le continent, a indiqué mardi une source autorisée à Kigali.
Au cours de cette réunion qui se tient à huis clos, le ministre rwandais de la Justice devra présenter notamment son plan adopté pour combattre "l’idéologie génocidaire" dans la région des Grands Lacs et en Afrique en général, a déclaré à la presse l'envoyé spécial du chef de l’Etat rwandais Paul Kagamé dans la région des Grands Lacs, Richard Sezibera.
"Le Rwanda va en outre insister surtout sur le rôle que vont jouers les pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais actuellement en quête d’asile", a-t-il précisé.
"Nous voulons établir un concept commun au niveau de l’Afrique pour combattre et arrêter tout génocide qui pourra éventuellement être perpétré sur le continent", a souligné pour sa part le président de la CISSA, le Sud-Africain D’Agoôt Majak.
Kigali déplore notamment, rappelle-t-on, le manque de coopération de certains pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais.
En 2004, le Rwanda a publié une liste de 93 personnes fugitives partout dans le monde, désignées comme étant des principaux planificateurs du génocide de 1994.
06/11/2007 11:57 am
Kigali, Rwanda (PANA) – Les chefs de sécurité et de renseignement en provenance de 46 pays africains regroupés au sein d’une structure régionale dénommée Security services of Africa (CISSA), se trouvent depuis deux jours à Kigali pour une réunion de consultation d’une semaine.
La rencontre devra être focalisée sur les enjeux ainsi que de nouvelles stratégies à adopter pour combattre le génocide et participer aux différentes missions de maintien de la paix à travers le continent, a indiqué mardi une source autorisée à Kigali.
Au cours de cette réunion qui se tient à huis clos, le ministre rwandais de la Justice devra présenter notamment son plan adopté pour combattre "l’idéologie génocidaire" dans la région des Grands Lacs et en Afrique en général, a déclaré à la presse l'envoyé spécial du chef de l’Etat rwandais Paul Kagamé dans la région des Grands Lacs, Richard Sezibera.
"Le Rwanda va en outre insister surtout sur le rôle que vont jouers les pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais actuellement en quête d’asile", a-t-il précisé.
"Nous voulons établir un concept commun au niveau de l’Afrique pour combattre et arrêter tout génocide qui pourra éventuellement être perpétré sur le continent", a souligné pour sa part le président de la CISSA, le Sud-Africain D’Agoôt Majak.
Kigali déplore notamment, rappelle-t-on, le manque de coopération de certains pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais.
En 2004, le Rwanda a publié une liste de 93 personnes fugitives partout dans le monde, désignées comme étant des principaux planificateurs du génocide de 1994.
vrijdag 9 november 2007
The French Military in Africa
Author: Andrew Hansen
Updated, March 22, 2007
Introduction
What are France’s interests in Africa?
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
What factors explain this evolution?
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
Introduction
For decades France viewed post-colonial Africa as its exclusive sphere of influence, or pré carré. France still maintains military influence and stations thousands of its troops across the continent, from western Senegal to the Horn of Africa. But changes in its strategic priorities, as well as its inability to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, have shifted France’s military role on the continent. France has folded many of its African missions into multinational operations. Yet some experts debate whether Africa should remain a top priority for French foreign policymakers or if its efforts on the continent are worthwhile.
What are France’s interests in Africa?
French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France’s exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments, and the protection of the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa. “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it’s shaken by conflict, we’re shaken as well,” said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa. But not everyone is convinced African affairs should be of primary importance to French foreign policy. François Roche, editor of the French version of Foreign Policy, argues that resources spent on Africa would be better placed in Asia and South America, where France’s future economic and geopolitical interests are likely to be.
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities, according to the French Ministry of Defense. There are three main French bases in Africa. The largest is at Djibouti, with smaller forces at Dakar in Senegal and Libreville in Gabon. Their purpose is to promote regional security, though the base in Djibouti allows France to exercise a measure of military influence in the Middle East. (Also in Djibouti are about 1,500 American personnel of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, stationed at the former French base Le Monier since 2003.) There is also a small French force on Reunion island, a French territory located off the coast of Madagascar.
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
Chad.
France fields some 1,200 troops in Chad to protect French nationals, support the government of President Idriss Deby Itno, and provide logistical and intelligence support to Chadian forces. On a recent visit, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin promised France would “honor its agreements with a friendly and legitimate government.” The airbase at Hadji Kossei near the capital, N’Djamena, has a small but impressive squadron of planes, including Mirage fighters. Chadian troops take advantage of intelligence gathered by these fighters and intelligence leaked from the French embassy. Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie insists the support is only logistical, but some contend that French special forces may be directly engaging rebel forces.
It would be good to remember that the Chadian government headed by mr Idriss Deby Itno is a usurper governement, illegal through a coup against the lawfully elected president Yorongar in 2001. As someone once remarked: France has a tendency to support dictators. Not so surprising when one remembers that many of those dictators came to power with the support of France. (this part of the article is from blogger's hand!)
Central African Republic (CAR).
France maintains some 300 troops in the CAR capital Bangui as part of Operation Boali, charged with restructuring the local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, an African force led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, a regional body. The French Foreign Ministry claims this intervention helps stabilize the region, a precondition for resolving the conflict in nearby Darfur. But France remains unwilling to intervene in Darfur outside of a multilateral framework. French support for President François Bozizé is a major factor in his maintenance of power. Armed rebellions in the northern and central regions remain a constant threat to the capital. French forces on the ground do not officially engage the rebels, but regional experts such as François Grignon of the International Crisis Group say it’s likely “French special forces were engaged for limited but decisive operations.” The Economist reported that French fighters, attack helicopters, and special forces quashed a rebel advance on the capital Bangui in late 2006, allowing government forces to retake towns captured by rebels.
Ivory Coast.
France deploys approximately 3,000 troops—under a UN mandate—to patrol the buffer zone between the rebel-controlled northern regions and the government-controlled south. The operation is France’s largest and most controversial in Africa. Intransigence on political reforms and disarmament has slowed democratic transition, but a peace was brokered between the government and rebel forces in March 2007. French soldiers and transport aircraft are stationed in nearby Togo to support the operations in Ivory Coast. Locals tend to view French troops as an occupation force; one French observer, as quoted in the Economist, calls Ivory Coast “France’s little Iraq.”
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
France intervened militarily in Africa nineteen times between 1962 and 1995. Most of the operations were ostensibly to protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments. Yet Professor Shaun Gregory of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in England points out that the standard for military support was contingent on an African leader’s willingness to support French interests. As France’s former colonies in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, most signed bilateral treaties pledging various degrees of military cooperation and support. Most of these treaties exist today, though some remain state secrets. France expanded these arrangements in the mid-1970s to include the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire—now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Currency links, entrenched French business interests, and close personal relationships between governing elites all contributed to the maintenance of France’s preeminence in the region from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The turning point came with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Some say that France’s humanitarian intervention there in June saved thousands of lives and stabilized the region. Critics, however, point to another French operation in April of that year, whereby a smaller force evacuated French nationals and certain “Rwandan personalities,” including some government officials who were accused of genocide. Andrew Wallis, a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, goes so far as to link military support for the Hutu regime with the slaughter that eventually occurred. The French embassy in the U.K. strongly denied the claim, saying that “France acted not only in order to prevent the tragedy, but also to mobilize the international community to come to the aid of the genocide victims.” Still, Gregory says Rwanda marked a turning point for French policy in francophone Africa.
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
Following French actions in Rwanda and a 1996-1997 crisis in Zaire in which France supported the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, a new Africa policy emerged that eschews a bilateral structure in favor of military cooperation with international forces and African regional bodies. France’s permanent bases are in the process of being ‘Europeanized,’ according to Brigadier General Dominique Trinquand, as France invites other European countries to commit forces to the bases. The placement of the bases is also consistent with the African Union’s geographical division of the continent into western, eastern, and central zones.
France conducts joint maneuvers and peacekeeping training through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and its Peacekeeping School (EMP) in Mali, which has trained over 800 African officers. These institutions intended to support the African Standing Force, a 20,000 strong rapid-response peacekeeping force projected to be ready by 2010.
Despite the move toward multilateralism, France hasn’t fully abandoned its traditional, bilateral structure. According to Radio France International, France has yet to officially revise or renegotiate the secret and public defense treaties signed with a select number of African countries. Critics charge that France uses this secrecy, as well as ambiguous definitions of what defines internal or external threats, to intervene according to its own interests. Even within an international framework, moreover, France has remained the motor of many peacekeeping operations during a period when Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a French national, has been UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. “France is still keen to exercise a leading role,” says Rachel Utley, a lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds, “while offsetting the political, military, diplomatic, and financial costs of formerly national operations.”
What factors explain this evolution?
Some experts say it was a series of political missteps in the 1990s that resulted in France's current policy on the continent. But budgetary concerns and a changing strategic climate have also pushed France toward its new multilateral approach. Structural changes in the armed forces—abandoning the draft, sharp reductions in the size of the French military, and base closures between 1997 and 2002—mean that France can no longer maintain the dominance it exercised in the 1960s and 1970s.
International terrorism has also emerged as a primary defense concern. France’s strategy is one of “prevention and projection,” which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current African deployments.
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
While France has reduced the size of its forces in Africa, the United States is increasing its presence. In addition to the counterterrorism force in Djibouti, the United States has secured agreements with ten southern and western African nations to provide them with logistical support. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently announced plans for the creation of a separate U.S.-Africa command to oversee operations on the continent, citing unstable African regions as possible havens for terrorists. In a larger context, some experts say a permanent Africa-based U.S. command could be taken as a sign that the era of exclusively French military influence on the continent is effectively over.
afterthought:
thousands of lives have been destroyed, others threatenend by african dictators like in Chad, sudan and elsewhere, in countries where democratcy has been destroyed by the criminal western politics, of france in particular, and of the liberal crusades of the USA in general
Updated, March 22, 2007
Introduction
What are France’s interests in Africa?
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
What factors explain this evolution?
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
Introduction
For decades France viewed post-colonial Africa as its exclusive sphere of influence, or pré carré. France still maintains military influence and stations thousands of its troops across the continent, from western Senegal to the Horn of Africa. But changes in its strategic priorities, as well as its inability to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, have shifted France’s military role on the continent. France has folded many of its African missions into multinational operations. Yet some experts debate whether Africa should remain a top priority for French foreign policymakers or if its efforts on the continent are worthwhile.
What are France’s interests in Africa?
French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France’s exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments, and the protection of the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa. “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it’s shaken by conflict, we’re shaken as well,” said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa. But not everyone is convinced African affairs should be of primary importance to French foreign policy. François Roche, editor of the French version of Foreign Policy, argues that resources spent on Africa would be better placed in Asia and South America, where France’s future economic and geopolitical interests are likely to be.
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities, according to the French Ministry of Defense. There are three main French bases in Africa. The largest is at Djibouti, with smaller forces at Dakar in Senegal and Libreville in Gabon. Their purpose is to promote regional security, though the base in Djibouti allows France to exercise a measure of military influence in the Middle East. (Also in Djibouti are about 1,500 American personnel of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, stationed at the former French base Le Monier since 2003.) There is also a small French force on Reunion island, a French territory located off the coast of Madagascar.
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
Chad.
France fields some 1,200 troops in Chad to protect French nationals, support the government of President Idriss Deby Itno, and provide logistical and intelligence support to Chadian forces. On a recent visit, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin promised France would “honor its agreements with a friendly and legitimate government.” The airbase at Hadji Kossei near the capital, N’Djamena, has a small but impressive squadron of planes, including Mirage fighters. Chadian troops take advantage of intelligence gathered by these fighters and intelligence leaked from the French embassy. Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie insists the support is only logistical, but some contend that French special forces may be directly engaging rebel forces.
It would be good to remember that the Chadian government headed by mr Idriss Deby Itno is a usurper governement, illegal through a coup against the lawfully elected president Yorongar in 2001. As someone once remarked: France has a tendency to support dictators. Not so surprising when one remembers that many of those dictators came to power with the support of France. (this part of the article is from blogger's hand!)
Central African Republic (CAR).
France maintains some 300 troops in the CAR capital Bangui as part of Operation Boali, charged with restructuring the local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, an African force led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, a regional body. The French Foreign Ministry claims this intervention helps stabilize the region, a precondition for resolving the conflict in nearby Darfur. But France remains unwilling to intervene in Darfur outside of a multilateral framework. French support for President François Bozizé is a major factor in his maintenance of power. Armed rebellions in the northern and central regions remain a constant threat to the capital. French forces on the ground do not officially engage the rebels, but regional experts such as François Grignon of the International Crisis Group say it’s likely “French special forces were engaged for limited but decisive operations.” The Economist reported that French fighters, attack helicopters, and special forces quashed a rebel advance on the capital Bangui in late 2006, allowing government forces to retake towns captured by rebels.
Ivory Coast.
France deploys approximately 3,000 troops—under a UN mandate—to patrol the buffer zone between the rebel-controlled northern regions and the government-controlled south. The operation is France’s largest and most controversial in Africa. Intransigence on political reforms and disarmament has slowed democratic transition, but a peace was brokered between the government and rebel forces in March 2007. French soldiers and transport aircraft are stationed in nearby Togo to support the operations in Ivory Coast. Locals tend to view French troops as an occupation force; one French observer, as quoted in the Economist, calls Ivory Coast “France’s little Iraq.”
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
France intervened militarily in Africa nineteen times between 1962 and 1995. Most of the operations were ostensibly to protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments. Yet Professor Shaun Gregory of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in England points out that the standard for military support was contingent on an African leader’s willingness to support French interests. As France’s former colonies in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, most signed bilateral treaties pledging various degrees of military cooperation and support. Most of these treaties exist today, though some remain state secrets. France expanded these arrangements in the mid-1970s to include the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire—now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Currency links, entrenched French business interests, and close personal relationships between governing elites all contributed to the maintenance of France’s preeminence in the region from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The turning point came with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Some say that France’s humanitarian intervention there in June saved thousands of lives and stabilized the region. Critics, however, point to another French operation in April of that year, whereby a smaller force evacuated French nationals and certain “Rwandan personalities,” including some government officials who were accused of genocide. Andrew Wallis, a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, goes so far as to link military support for the Hutu regime with the slaughter that eventually occurred. The French embassy in the U.K. strongly denied the claim, saying that “France acted not only in order to prevent the tragedy, but also to mobilize the international community to come to the aid of the genocide victims.” Still, Gregory says Rwanda marked a turning point for French policy in francophone Africa.
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
Following French actions in Rwanda and a 1996-1997 crisis in Zaire in which France supported the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, a new Africa policy emerged that eschews a bilateral structure in favor of military cooperation with international forces and African regional bodies. France’s permanent bases are in the process of being ‘Europeanized,’ according to Brigadier General Dominique Trinquand, as France invites other European countries to commit forces to the bases. The placement of the bases is also consistent with the African Union’s geographical division of the continent into western, eastern, and central zones.
France conducts joint maneuvers and peacekeeping training through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and its Peacekeeping School (EMP) in Mali, which has trained over 800 African officers. These institutions intended to support the African Standing Force, a 20,000 strong rapid-response peacekeeping force projected to be ready by 2010.
Despite the move toward multilateralism, France hasn’t fully abandoned its traditional, bilateral structure. According to Radio France International, France has yet to officially revise or renegotiate the secret and public defense treaties signed with a select number of African countries. Critics charge that France uses this secrecy, as well as ambiguous definitions of what defines internal or external threats, to intervene according to its own interests. Even within an international framework, moreover, France has remained the motor of many peacekeeping operations during a period when Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a French national, has been UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. “France is still keen to exercise a leading role,” says Rachel Utley, a lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds, “while offsetting the political, military, diplomatic, and financial costs of formerly national operations.”
What factors explain this evolution?
Some experts say it was a series of political missteps in the 1990s that resulted in France's current policy on the continent. But budgetary concerns and a changing strategic climate have also pushed France toward its new multilateral approach. Structural changes in the armed forces—abandoning the draft, sharp reductions in the size of the French military, and base closures between 1997 and 2002—mean that France can no longer maintain the dominance it exercised in the 1960s and 1970s.
International terrorism has also emerged as a primary defense concern. France’s strategy is one of “prevention and projection,” which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current African deployments.
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
While France has reduced the size of its forces in Africa, the United States is increasing its presence. In addition to the counterterrorism force in Djibouti, the United States has secured agreements with ten southern and western African nations to provide them with logistical support. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently announced plans for the creation of a separate U.S.-Africa command to oversee operations on the continent, citing unstable African regions as possible havens for terrorists. In a larger context, some experts say a permanent Africa-based U.S. command could be taken as a sign that the era of exclusively French military influence on the continent is effectively over.
afterthought:
thousands of lives have been destroyed, others threatenend by african dictators like in Chad, sudan and elsewhere, in countries where democratcy has been destroyed by the criminal western politics, of france in particular, and of the liberal crusades of the USA in general
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