one of the most scandalous features of all that surrounds the Rwanda 1994 genocide is the attitude of a number of catholic priests and nuns and one bishop and their role in the genocide. The attitude of Pope john Paul II is also something one could hardly be proud of, to say the least.
...Habyarimana and his wife Agathe were impressive disciples of the Catholic Church...the Gospel of the White Fathers was obedience to authority. This religious foundation,more than other, threw its weight behind ethnic division and authoritarian rule. By the 60s the church and state had bonded into one entity, preaching the gospel of Hutu supremacy and total loyalty to the leadership in the capital Kigali.
....(one of the most atrocious genocidaires among the catholic clergy, Wenceslaus Munyeshyaka) managed to get out of the country and via Goma fled to France, where under the auspices of the White Fathers, who had close links to the Habyarimana regime, he was installes in the parish of Bourg-St-Andeol.
..With powerful church allies such as the White Fathers...Munyeshyaka managed to evade the courts and justice...(eventually) he moved to a White Fathers safe house when the press became interested again in his case in 2004.
( Andrew Wallis in "the Silent Accomplice")
The crime of this genocide has its roots, among other things, in the efforts of both the belgian government and the local catholic (white) hierarchy to establish an ethnic and catholic republic in Rwanda after the parmehutu party had performed their coup in 1961. At the time there were signs that the Tutsi elite wanted independence for Rwanda. It looks as if the actions taken by the catholic white hierarchy were inspired by its fear to lose its influence if that independence would indeed come about. Thus this same hierachy saw no evil in making common cause with -that much was already clear at that time- an ethnic and openly racist hutu government, that was intent on exterminatg its Tutsi citizens, only for being born tutsi. Even today, anno 2007,the catholics of Rwanda find it hard to believe that the catholic hierarchy was involved to such an extent in the killings.
Maybe the catholic leadership were still very much impressed by the genocidal myths in the bible, the old testament to be pr4ecise: (and here I am paraphrasing Jean Paul Gouteux: )the mass-killings of the original palestinian inhabitants after the jews returned from Egypt, the killing of people with the, for the tribal God of Abraham and his crowd, unacceptable sexual leanings of the people of Sodom and Gomorra. the killing of the whole human race except Noe and his people .... "when one venerates a genocidal and recidivist god, everything becomes possible". (Jean-Paul Gouteux in "La Nuit Rwandaise", april 2007, page 176).
What has lead up to all this?
As early as 1957 (so even before the Mwami (king) was expelled) the then prime minister Kayibanda published his "Notes on the social aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda" (notes sur l'aspect social du probleme racial indigene au Rwanda). Responsible for the text of this openly racist manifesto, because that is what it is, were two white fathers, Ernotte and Dejemeppe, under the auspices of the then archbishop of Kabgayi, the swiss Perraudin (also member of the White Fathers Society).
Obviously on the strength and gist of this manifesto it did not take long (1960)before the Tutsi were declared "stangers" in their own country. Rwanda is said to be the country of the Bahutu, and the Tutsi were invited to emigrate to their country of origin: Ethiopia.
Where the devil did they (Bahutu goverment) get that idea of the Tutsi origins from? Here again, the white fathers were behind it. It was one of them (Pages) who wrote a pseudo-scientific book entitled " un royaume hamite au centre de l 'Afrique" posing as dogma the theory that the Tutsi (hamitic race!!!) migrated into Rwanda about 300-350 years ago from Egypt. They are said to have conquered a country that had always been inhabited by Bahutu; this was the official theory and imaginary sociology of Rwandan society that bishop Classe (of the white fathers) had ordered to be spread among the parishes in Rwanda and all the catholic schools.(forgetting of course that the Bahutu themselves are descendents of people who migrated into East Africa about 2000 years ago from what is now eastern Nigeria and Cameroun).
The belgian colonial administration had long before the 1960's come up the stupid idea of mentioning on the identity papers of the Rwandan population whether they were Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. A distinction that never had played any practical role in Rwandan society. Often enough people did not really know what they were. And inter- marriages were common all the time. This was one of the most important mechanisms of the belgians to set up groups of the population against each other. And the white fathers followed suit admirably. For years the Tutsi were the favourite sons, but when their elite, as has been mentioned above, started clamouring for independence, they immediately fell out of favour. Imagine ! Rwanda had been dedicated by the catholic hierarchy the Christ the King, and thus what the Tutsi elite demanded ran 100% counter to the hierarchy's idea of Rwanda and Burundi being the domain of the catholic church and its spreading into East Africa. So the Tutsi became the bad boys and the Hutu the good boys: in 1959 (Rwanda was still a kingdom) the quite reactionary White ftahers, in the person of bishop Perraudin, made themselves immortally ridiculous by stating in his (Perraudin's) lenten message: "In our Rwanda there are different races each with their specific traits,..on the one hand the riches and power and on the other hand even the judiciary are for the major part in the hands of people of the same race". Together with the (later, see above) hutu manifest we see the elaboration of a racist social doctrine, the (white members of the hierarchy of) Church chose clear sides with the ethnicity idea, and maintained this to the end. It is remarkable that the christan belgian labour mouvement gave its supprt to all this. The not very intelligent flemish White Fathers compared the "walloon arrogance" at home with "the tutsi arrogance" in Rwanda, and thus the stage was set for a number of interesting developments and utterings: the flemish priest Desouter and many of his associates hating the Tutsi as much as they could dug up the old cliches of the "hardworking peasant Hutu".
When the first massacres of tutsi began in 1959 (my in-laws fled to Congo at that time) these priests and their crowd were jubilant. Years later in 1994 the openly reactionary and racist flemish White Father Aelvoet fondly remembered those great moments: "For us the history of Rwanda starts in 1994. All that came before it was Tutsi culture.The Hutu revolt, (ending the kingdom) I have lived through it with great pain in my heart, because there were many dead. But I was really happy. When the death of the Mwami (Mutara Rudahigwa, it is said he was poisoned by the belgians) was made known I told my parishoners: tomorrow were are going to celebtate a Mass of requiem. But in reality there should be a Te Deum (a hymn in the roman catholic rituals to thank God for favours received) that we ought to sing. I have buried the first Tutsi chiefs in Gitarama. the local Hutu danced with joy brandishing their machetes and shouted: "they should return to Abyssinia" They did not want these people buried and said: "Father come back to-morrow, there will be more".
It illustrates how the catholic priests had adopted the game of setting one ethnic group up against the other. Together with the White Fathers the belgian Internationale Democratique Chretienne (IDC) joined hands to fight the Tutsi aristocracy. It has all been well documented in a book by Leon Saur (Influences Parallelles), showing how strong their support was for the racist Hutu leaders, and their links with (1992) the Rwandan Information Office (ORINFOR) that had just been inciting people to commit the massacres in Bugesera. It need not surprise anyone that sniffing up the atmosphere in belgium, that even after the genocide the flemish member of parlement Jan van Erps (CVP) dared to say he was "proud to be a flemish Hutu"
(to be continued)
zondag 18 november 2007
woensdag 14 november 2007
Un ancien ministre rwandais arrêté en Allemagne
Coup de filet de la police criminelle allemande : Augustin Ngirabatware, recherché depuis 2001 par la justice internationale pour son rôle dans le génocide rwandais de 1994, a été arrêté lundi à Francfort. L’ancien ministre doit être livré au Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR). Ecoutez la réaction de Marcel Kabanda, président de la section française d’IBUKA, une association à la mémoire des victimes du génocide. Il est au micro d’Anne Le Touzé
Les responsables du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda ont annoncé avoir entrepris des démarches auprès des autorités allemandes en vue du transfert d’Augustin Ngirabatware au siège du tribunal à Arusha, en Tanzanie. Le bureau du procureur a indiqué qu'au regard de l'importance de la responsabilité présumée de l’ancien ministre dans le génocide de 1994, il n'est pas question de transférer son affaire devant une juridiction nationale, même si le TPIR doit conclure ses travaux d’ici la fin de l’année prochaine.
Concernant la décision française de remettre en liberté sous contrôle judiciaire Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta, le TPIR a assuré ne pas être surpris. Selon le porte-parole du tribunal, Roland Amoussouga, cette décision "entre dans le cadre normal de la procédure qui permettra à la justice française de se prononcer sur la validité des mandats d'arrêt du TPIR" et sur la question de leur transfert.
Deutsche Welle, 20 sept 2007
Les responsables du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda ont annoncé avoir entrepris des démarches auprès des autorités allemandes en vue du transfert d’Augustin Ngirabatware au siège du tribunal à Arusha, en Tanzanie. Le bureau du procureur a indiqué qu'au regard de l'importance de la responsabilité présumée de l’ancien ministre dans le génocide de 1994, il n'est pas question de transférer son affaire devant une juridiction nationale, même si le TPIR doit conclure ses travaux d’ici la fin de l’année prochaine.
Concernant la décision française de remettre en liberté sous contrôle judiciaire Wenceslas Munyeshyaka et Laurent Bucyibaruta, le TPIR a assuré ne pas être surpris. Selon le porte-parole du tribunal, Roland Amoussouga, cette décision "entre dans le cadre normal de la procédure qui permettra à la justice française de se prononcer sur la validité des mandats d'arrêt du TPIR" et sur la question de leur transfert.
Deutsche Welle, 20 sept 2007
Habyarimana Crash Probe Team Braces for New Task
The New Times (Kigali)
22 October 2007
Posted to the web 23 October 2007
Felly Kimenyi
Kigali
Investigations into the plane crash that claimed the life of former president Juvenal Habyarimana and others will kick off in less than a month, the Justice Minister has said.
Tharcisse Karugarama said yesterday that the seven commissioners named on the independent commission will have to resign their respective jobs, saying that the investigation cannot be carried out alongside other official duties.
"We decided to give them time to wind up their work before we pass the law appointing them so that they can resume work, the whole preparations will take like a month," Karugarama said.
Habyarimana died in a plane crash on April 6, 1994 a day before the Genocide officially unfolded which would later claim at least one million people.
The plane, Falcon 50 registration number 9XR-NN, which was also carrying then Burundi's president Cyprian Ntaryamira, was shot down near Kigali International Airport.
The probe team which was named two weeks ago by Cabinet will be chaired by Justice Jean Mutsinzi, a judge in the Supreme Court.
Mutsinzi, who is a former chief justice, also sits on a panel of judges for African court on human and people's rights. Mutsinzi refused to comment on the new assignments.
"There is nothing I can comment regarding the commission because I was just appointed verbally. I can only comment after the Ministerial Order is published with our names," Mutsinzi said. He said that it would be the same order that will define the modus operandi of the commission and its timeline of operation.
The justice minister said that the commission may be given a period of up to one year to compile evidence and hand over their findings to Cabinet.
The minister said that the reason the government took this initiative to appoint the commission was the fact that the international community had persistently ignored the government's calls for the investigation into the crash.
"We think it is time for the world to know what happened. Nothing has been done by the world to investigate it .the only probe that was carried out was by the French and their findings were not concrete," Karugarama said.
Other members of the commission are Dr Jean Damascene Bizimana (vice president), Alice Rugira (secretary), Augustin Mukama, Jean Baptiste Mvano, Judith Mbabazi and Peter Mugenzi.
The vice-president and the secretary are also commissioners to a separate probe team charged with adducing evidence on the role played by France during the 1994 Genocide. This particular commission will wind up its work next month.
Most members of the Mutsinzi commission are jurists with investigating and airport operations background. For instance, Mugenzi is a former director of Civil Aviation Authority.
22 October 2007
Posted to the web 23 October 2007
Felly Kimenyi
Kigali
Investigations into the plane crash that claimed the life of former president Juvenal Habyarimana and others will kick off in less than a month, the Justice Minister has said.
Tharcisse Karugarama said yesterday that the seven commissioners named on the independent commission will have to resign their respective jobs, saying that the investigation cannot be carried out alongside other official duties.
"We decided to give them time to wind up their work before we pass the law appointing them so that they can resume work, the whole preparations will take like a month," Karugarama said.
Habyarimana died in a plane crash on April 6, 1994 a day before the Genocide officially unfolded which would later claim at least one million people.
The plane, Falcon 50 registration number 9XR-NN, which was also carrying then Burundi's president Cyprian Ntaryamira, was shot down near Kigali International Airport.
The probe team which was named two weeks ago by Cabinet will be chaired by Justice Jean Mutsinzi, a judge in the Supreme Court.
Mutsinzi, who is a former chief justice, also sits on a panel of judges for African court on human and people's rights. Mutsinzi refused to comment on the new assignments.
"There is nothing I can comment regarding the commission because I was just appointed verbally. I can only comment after the Ministerial Order is published with our names," Mutsinzi said. He said that it would be the same order that will define the modus operandi of the commission and its timeline of operation.
The justice minister said that the commission may be given a period of up to one year to compile evidence and hand over their findings to Cabinet.
The minister said that the reason the government took this initiative to appoint the commission was the fact that the international community had persistently ignored the government's calls for the investigation into the crash.
"We think it is time for the world to know what happened. Nothing has been done by the world to investigate it .the only probe that was carried out was by the French and their findings were not concrete," Karugarama said.
Other members of the commission are Dr Jean Damascene Bizimana (vice president), Alice Rugira (secretary), Augustin Mukama, Jean Baptiste Mvano, Judith Mbabazi and Peter Mugenzi.
The vice-president and the secretary are also commissioners to a separate probe team charged with adducing evidence on the role played by France during the 1994 Genocide. This particular commission will wind up its work next month.
Most members of the Mutsinzi commission are jurists with investigating and airport operations background. For instance, Mugenzi is a former director of Civil Aviation Authority.
Réunion panafricaine des chefs de sécurité à Kigali
Christophe Casalegno
06/11/2007 11:57 am
Kigali, Rwanda (PANA) – Les chefs de sécurité et de renseignement en provenance de 46 pays africains regroupés au sein d’une structure régionale dénommée Security services of Africa (CISSA), se trouvent depuis deux jours à Kigali pour une réunion de consultation d’une semaine.
La rencontre devra être focalisée sur les enjeux ainsi que de nouvelles stratégies à adopter pour combattre le génocide et participer aux différentes missions de maintien de la paix à travers le continent, a indiqué mardi une source autorisée à Kigali.
Au cours de cette réunion qui se tient à huis clos, le ministre rwandais de la Justice devra présenter notamment son plan adopté pour combattre "l’idéologie génocidaire" dans la région des Grands Lacs et en Afrique en général, a déclaré à la presse l'envoyé spécial du chef de l’Etat rwandais Paul Kagamé dans la région des Grands Lacs, Richard Sezibera.
"Le Rwanda va en outre insister surtout sur le rôle que vont jouers les pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais actuellement en quête d’asile", a-t-il précisé.
"Nous voulons établir un concept commun au niveau de l’Afrique pour combattre et arrêter tout génocide qui pourra éventuellement être perpétré sur le continent", a souligné pour sa part le président de la CISSA, le Sud-Africain D’Agoôt Majak.
Kigali déplore notamment, rappelle-t-on, le manque de coopération de certains pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais.
En 2004, le Rwanda a publié une liste de 93 personnes fugitives partout dans le monde, désignées comme étant des principaux planificateurs du génocide de 1994.
06/11/2007 11:57 am
Kigali, Rwanda (PANA) – Les chefs de sécurité et de renseignement en provenance de 46 pays africains regroupés au sein d’une structure régionale dénommée Security services of Africa (CISSA), se trouvent depuis deux jours à Kigali pour une réunion de consultation d’une semaine.
La rencontre devra être focalisée sur les enjeux ainsi que de nouvelles stratégies à adopter pour combattre le génocide et participer aux différentes missions de maintien de la paix à travers le continent, a indiqué mardi une source autorisée à Kigali.
Au cours de cette réunion qui se tient à huis clos, le ministre rwandais de la Justice devra présenter notamment son plan adopté pour combattre "l’idéologie génocidaire" dans la région des Grands Lacs et en Afrique en général, a déclaré à la presse l'envoyé spécial du chef de l’Etat rwandais Paul Kagamé dans la région des Grands Lacs, Richard Sezibera.
"Le Rwanda va en outre insister surtout sur le rôle que vont jouers les pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais actuellement en quête d’asile", a-t-il précisé.
"Nous voulons établir un concept commun au niveau de l’Afrique pour combattre et arrêter tout génocide qui pourra éventuellement être perpétré sur le continent", a souligné pour sa part le président de la CISSA, le Sud-Africain D’Agoôt Majak.
Kigali déplore notamment, rappelle-t-on, le manque de coopération de certains pays africains dans l’arrestation des fugitifs génocidaires rwandais.
En 2004, le Rwanda a publié une liste de 93 personnes fugitives partout dans le monde, désignées comme étant des principaux planificateurs du génocide de 1994.
La stratégie des tortues
Il parait que de passage à Strasbourg, Jean Hatzfeld s'est arrêté dans une librairie pour présenter son dernier livre, "la stratégie des antilopes".
Mon propos n'est pas de vous parler de son livre que je n'ai d'ailleurs pas encore lu, si ce n'est quelques passages qui montrent qu'il semble aussi intéressant que les premiers. Jean Hatzfeld a le mérite de rendre compte de ce que vivent les Rwandais de la base après le génocide.
Il y eut des questions dans la salle. Une personne demanda à l'auteur ce qu'il pensait de l'engagement de la France au Rwanda. La réponse fut surprenante : il a employé une image, celle des alliés pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, lorsqu'ils bombardèrent l'Europe pour chasser les nazis. Stupéfiant ! Quel rapport ? Les nazis ont accompli un génocide. Ils avaient envahi l'Europe. Les alliés étaient les ennemis des génocidaires, même si ce n'est pas à cause du génocide des Juifs qu'ils débarquèrent en France. Au Rwanda seul le Rwanda était concerné. La France étaient l'alliée du régime génocidaire et l'opération Turquoise a entre autre servi à évacuer les génocidaires.
Cela rappelle l'expression désinformatrice : "Les Français ne tenaient pas les machettes".
Jean Hatzfeld a beau être un bon écrivain, il montre là un très faible sens de la fidélité aux faits historiques. Une telle erreur de jugement entre dans le champ de la désinformation. Cela fait froid dans le dos.
Jean Hatzfeld travaille dans le champ des Rwandais qui tenaient les machettes. Sa débandade strasbourgeoise pourrait laisser penser qu'il cherche à montrer que c'était uniquement cela.
Voyez vous Monsieur Hatzfeld, nous les tortues de Survie, nous sommes partis les premiers, en 1993, sous l'impulsion de Jean Carbonare, puis de François-Xavier Verschave. Inlassablement nous avons marché pour faire comprendre à nos concitoyens que nos autorités ont failli au Rwanda comme dans bien d'autres pays africains, mais là plus gravement encore. Seuls peut être les massacres des Bamilikés du Cameroun, ont été plus graves encore, car il semble qu'alors des centaines de milliers de morts ont subi les effets d'une armée encadrées directement par des officiers français, ce qui ne semble pas le cas au Rwanda pendant le génocide.
Voyez-vous, Monsieur Hatzfeld, les autorités françaises nous balancent de temps en temps quelques lièvres sur le dos en espérant nous dépasser avant que nous arrivions au but. Mais nous avons la carapace dure, une bonne mémoire et nous marchons comme des tortues parties les premières. Plus on nous raconte de salades, plus nous avons à manger...
La France n'a pas tenue les machettes, mais il n'y avait pas que des machettes dans les massacres génocidaires. Il y avait aussi une armée rwandaise, formée et armée par la France, qui intervenait dans les massacres toutes les fois que les miliciens avaient besoin d'un coup de pouce. C'est un fait établi. Les officiers français et l'ambassadeur de France au Rwanda, pendant la période qui a précédé le génocide, ont eu tout le loisir d'apprécier l'intention génocidaire, telle que Jean Carbonare l'a dénoncée 15 mois avant le génocide au micro de Bruno Masure au journal de 20 heures. Le Général Jean Varret a rapporté aux députés français comment il a connu la question Tutsi au Rwanda, de la bouche du chef d'Etat major de la gendarmerie rwandaise, en octobre 1990 : "Ils sont très peu nombreux, nous allons les liquider". Au même moment l'ambassadeur de France au Rwanda envoyait des télégrammes, qu'on trouve dans les annexes du rapport des députés, qui parlaient noir sur blanc du risque de génocide et de possibles massacres de "500 à 700 000 personnes". Dès 1990 ! (Voir ci-contre)
C'est donc en toute connaissance de cause que la France a soutenu pendant trois ans les fonctionnaires de la "saison de machettes" que vous avez si bien décrite, Monsieur Haztfeld.
Connaissance de l'intention génocidaire et aide aux forces qui préparent, puis accomplissent, ce génocide, c'est un cocktail difficile à masquer Monsieur Hatzfeld. Comment pouvez-vous prendre de telles images, les alliés en 1945, pour expliquer l'engagement français au Rwanda ? C'est insensé !
E.C. 20 octobre 2007
Mon propos n'est pas de vous parler de son livre que je n'ai d'ailleurs pas encore lu, si ce n'est quelques passages qui montrent qu'il semble aussi intéressant que les premiers. Jean Hatzfeld a le mérite de rendre compte de ce que vivent les Rwandais de la base après le génocide.
Il y eut des questions dans la salle. Une personne demanda à l'auteur ce qu'il pensait de l'engagement de la France au Rwanda. La réponse fut surprenante : il a employé une image, celle des alliés pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, lorsqu'ils bombardèrent l'Europe pour chasser les nazis. Stupéfiant ! Quel rapport ? Les nazis ont accompli un génocide. Ils avaient envahi l'Europe. Les alliés étaient les ennemis des génocidaires, même si ce n'est pas à cause du génocide des Juifs qu'ils débarquèrent en France. Au Rwanda seul le Rwanda était concerné. La France étaient l'alliée du régime génocidaire et l'opération Turquoise a entre autre servi à évacuer les génocidaires.
Cela rappelle l'expression désinformatrice : "Les Français ne tenaient pas les machettes".
Jean Hatzfeld a beau être un bon écrivain, il montre là un très faible sens de la fidélité aux faits historiques. Une telle erreur de jugement entre dans le champ de la désinformation. Cela fait froid dans le dos.
Jean Hatzfeld travaille dans le champ des Rwandais qui tenaient les machettes. Sa débandade strasbourgeoise pourrait laisser penser qu'il cherche à montrer que c'était uniquement cela.
Voyez vous Monsieur Hatzfeld, nous les tortues de Survie, nous sommes partis les premiers, en 1993, sous l'impulsion de Jean Carbonare, puis de François-Xavier Verschave. Inlassablement nous avons marché pour faire comprendre à nos concitoyens que nos autorités ont failli au Rwanda comme dans bien d'autres pays africains, mais là plus gravement encore. Seuls peut être les massacres des Bamilikés du Cameroun, ont été plus graves encore, car il semble qu'alors des centaines de milliers de morts ont subi les effets d'une armée encadrées directement par des officiers français, ce qui ne semble pas le cas au Rwanda pendant le génocide.
Voyez-vous, Monsieur Hatzfeld, les autorités françaises nous balancent de temps en temps quelques lièvres sur le dos en espérant nous dépasser avant que nous arrivions au but. Mais nous avons la carapace dure, une bonne mémoire et nous marchons comme des tortues parties les premières. Plus on nous raconte de salades, plus nous avons à manger...
La France n'a pas tenue les machettes, mais il n'y avait pas que des machettes dans les massacres génocidaires. Il y avait aussi une armée rwandaise, formée et armée par la France, qui intervenait dans les massacres toutes les fois que les miliciens avaient besoin d'un coup de pouce. C'est un fait établi. Les officiers français et l'ambassadeur de France au Rwanda, pendant la période qui a précédé le génocide, ont eu tout le loisir d'apprécier l'intention génocidaire, telle que Jean Carbonare l'a dénoncée 15 mois avant le génocide au micro de Bruno Masure au journal de 20 heures. Le Général Jean Varret a rapporté aux députés français comment il a connu la question Tutsi au Rwanda, de la bouche du chef d'Etat major de la gendarmerie rwandaise, en octobre 1990 : "Ils sont très peu nombreux, nous allons les liquider". Au même moment l'ambassadeur de France au Rwanda envoyait des télégrammes, qu'on trouve dans les annexes du rapport des députés, qui parlaient noir sur blanc du risque de génocide et de possibles massacres de "500 à 700 000 personnes". Dès 1990 ! (Voir ci-contre)
C'est donc en toute connaissance de cause que la France a soutenu pendant trois ans les fonctionnaires de la "saison de machettes" que vous avez si bien décrite, Monsieur Haztfeld.
Connaissance de l'intention génocidaire et aide aux forces qui préparent, puis accomplissent, ce génocide, c'est un cocktail difficile à masquer Monsieur Hatzfeld. Comment pouvez-vous prendre de telles images, les alliés en 1945, pour expliquer l'engagement français au Rwanda ? C'est insensé !
E.C. 20 octobre 2007
vrijdag 9 november 2007
The French Military in Africa
Author: Andrew Hansen
Updated, March 22, 2007
Introduction
What are France’s interests in Africa?
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
What factors explain this evolution?
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
Introduction
For decades France viewed post-colonial Africa as its exclusive sphere of influence, or pré carré. France still maintains military influence and stations thousands of its troops across the continent, from western Senegal to the Horn of Africa. But changes in its strategic priorities, as well as its inability to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, have shifted France’s military role on the continent. France has folded many of its African missions into multinational operations. Yet some experts debate whether Africa should remain a top priority for French foreign policymakers or if its efforts on the continent are worthwhile.
What are France’s interests in Africa?
French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France’s exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments, and the protection of the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa. “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it’s shaken by conflict, we’re shaken as well,” said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa. But not everyone is convinced African affairs should be of primary importance to French foreign policy. François Roche, editor of the French version of Foreign Policy, argues that resources spent on Africa would be better placed in Asia and South America, where France’s future economic and geopolitical interests are likely to be.
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities, according to the French Ministry of Defense. There are three main French bases in Africa. The largest is at Djibouti, with smaller forces at Dakar in Senegal and Libreville in Gabon. Their purpose is to promote regional security, though the base in Djibouti allows France to exercise a measure of military influence in the Middle East. (Also in Djibouti are about 1,500 American personnel of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, stationed at the former French base Le Monier since 2003.) There is also a small French force on Reunion island, a French territory located off the coast of Madagascar.
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
Chad.
France fields some 1,200 troops in Chad to protect French nationals, support the government of President Idriss Deby Itno, and provide logistical and intelligence support to Chadian forces. On a recent visit, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin promised France would “honor its agreements with a friendly and legitimate government.” The airbase at Hadji Kossei near the capital, N’Djamena, has a small but impressive squadron of planes, including Mirage fighters. Chadian troops take advantage of intelligence gathered by these fighters and intelligence leaked from the French embassy. Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie insists the support is only logistical, but some contend that French special forces may be directly engaging rebel forces.
It would be good to remember that the Chadian government headed by mr Idriss Deby Itno is a usurper governement, illegal through a coup against the lawfully elected president Yorongar in 2001. As someone once remarked: France has a tendency to support dictators. Not so surprising when one remembers that many of those dictators came to power with the support of France. (this part of the article is from blogger's hand!)
Central African Republic (CAR).
France maintains some 300 troops in the CAR capital Bangui as part of Operation Boali, charged with restructuring the local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, an African force led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, a regional body. The French Foreign Ministry claims this intervention helps stabilize the region, a precondition for resolving the conflict in nearby Darfur. But France remains unwilling to intervene in Darfur outside of a multilateral framework. French support for President François Bozizé is a major factor in his maintenance of power. Armed rebellions in the northern and central regions remain a constant threat to the capital. French forces on the ground do not officially engage the rebels, but regional experts such as François Grignon of the International Crisis Group say it’s likely “French special forces were engaged for limited but decisive operations.” The Economist reported that French fighters, attack helicopters, and special forces quashed a rebel advance on the capital Bangui in late 2006, allowing government forces to retake towns captured by rebels.
Ivory Coast.
France deploys approximately 3,000 troops—under a UN mandate—to patrol the buffer zone between the rebel-controlled northern regions and the government-controlled south. The operation is France’s largest and most controversial in Africa. Intransigence on political reforms and disarmament has slowed democratic transition, but a peace was brokered between the government and rebel forces in March 2007. French soldiers and transport aircraft are stationed in nearby Togo to support the operations in Ivory Coast. Locals tend to view French troops as an occupation force; one French observer, as quoted in the Economist, calls Ivory Coast “France’s little Iraq.”
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
France intervened militarily in Africa nineteen times between 1962 and 1995. Most of the operations were ostensibly to protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments. Yet Professor Shaun Gregory of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in England points out that the standard for military support was contingent on an African leader’s willingness to support French interests. As France’s former colonies in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, most signed bilateral treaties pledging various degrees of military cooperation and support. Most of these treaties exist today, though some remain state secrets. France expanded these arrangements in the mid-1970s to include the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire—now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Currency links, entrenched French business interests, and close personal relationships between governing elites all contributed to the maintenance of France’s preeminence in the region from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The turning point came with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Some say that France’s humanitarian intervention there in June saved thousands of lives and stabilized the region. Critics, however, point to another French operation in April of that year, whereby a smaller force evacuated French nationals and certain “Rwandan personalities,” including some government officials who were accused of genocide. Andrew Wallis, a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, goes so far as to link military support for the Hutu regime with the slaughter that eventually occurred. The French embassy in the U.K. strongly denied the claim, saying that “France acted not only in order to prevent the tragedy, but also to mobilize the international community to come to the aid of the genocide victims.” Still, Gregory says Rwanda marked a turning point for French policy in francophone Africa.
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
Following French actions in Rwanda and a 1996-1997 crisis in Zaire in which France supported the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, a new Africa policy emerged that eschews a bilateral structure in favor of military cooperation with international forces and African regional bodies. France’s permanent bases are in the process of being ‘Europeanized,’ according to Brigadier General Dominique Trinquand, as France invites other European countries to commit forces to the bases. The placement of the bases is also consistent with the African Union’s geographical division of the continent into western, eastern, and central zones.
France conducts joint maneuvers and peacekeeping training through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and its Peacekeeping School (EMP) in Mali, which has trained over 800 African officers. These institutions intended to support the African Standing Force, a 20,000 strong rapid-response peacekeeping force projected to be ready by 2010.
Despite the move toward multilateralism, France hasn’t fully abandoned its traditional, bilateral structure. According to Radio France International, France has yet to officially revise or renegotiate the secret and public defense treaties signed with a select number of African countries. Critics charge that France uses this secrecy, as well as ambiguous definitions of what defines internal or external threats, to intervene according to its own interests. Even within an international framework, moreover, France has remained the motor of many peacekeeping operations during a period when Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a French national, has been UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. “France is still keen to exercise a leading role,” says Rachel Utley, a lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds, “while offsetting the political, military, diplomatic, and financial costs of formerly national operations.”
What factors explain this evolution?
Some experts say it was a series of political missteps in the 1990s that resulted in France's current policy on the continent. But budgetary concerns and a changing strategic climate have also pushed France toward its new multilateral approach. Structural changes in the armed forces—abandoning the draft, sharp reductions in the size of the French military, and base closures between 1997 and 2002—mean that France can no longer maintain the dominance it exercised in the 1960s and 1970s.
International terrorism has also emerged as a primary defense concern. France’s strategy is one of “prevention and projection,” which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current African deployments.
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
While France has reduced the size of its forces in Africa, the United States is increasing its presence. In addition to the counterterrorism force in Djibouti, the United States has secured agreements with ten southern and western African nations to provide them with logistical support. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently announced plans for the creation of a separate U.S.-Africa command to oversee operations on the continent, citing unstable African regions as possible havens for terrorists. In a larger context, some experts say a permanent Africa-based U.S. command could be taken as a sign that the era of exclusively French military influence on the continent is effectively over.
afterthought:
thousands of lives have been destroyed, others threatenend by african dictators like in Chad, sudan and elsewhere, in countries where democratcy has been destroyed by the criminal western politics, of france in particular, and of the liberal crusades of the USA in general
Updated, March 22, 2007
Introduction
What are France’s interests in Africa?
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
What factors explain this evolution?
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
Introduction
For decades France viewed post-colonial Africa as its exclusive sphere of influence, or pré carré. France still maintains military influence and stations thousands of its troops across the continent, from western Senegal to the Horn of Africa. But changes in its strategic priorities, as well as its inability to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, have shifted France’s military role on the continent. France has folded many of its African missions into multinational operations. Yet some experts debate whether Africa should remain a top priority for French foreign policymakers or if its efforts on the continent are worthwhile.
What are France’s interests in Africa?
French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France’s exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments, and the protection of the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa. “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it’s shaken by conflict, we’re shaken as well,” said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa. But not everyone is convinced African affairs should be of primary importance to French foreign policy. François Roche, editor of the French version of Foreign Policy, argues that resources spent on Africa would be better placed in Asia and South America, where France’s future economic and geopolitical interests are likely to be.
Where are French troops based in Africa?
Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities, according to the French Ministry of Defense. There are three main French bases in Africa. The largest is at Djibouti, with smaller forces at Dakar in Senegal and Libreville in Gabon. Their purpose is to promote regional security, though the base in Djibouti allows France to exercise a measure of military influence in the Middle East. (Also in Djibouti are about 1,500 American personnel of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, stationed at the former French base Le Monier since 2003.) There is also a small French force on Reunion island, a French territory located off the coast of Madagascar.
Where are France’s main military engagements in Africa?
Chad.
France fields some 1,200 troops in Chad to protect French nationals, support the government of President Idriss Deby Itno, and provide logistical and intelligence support to Chadian forces. On a recent visit, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin promised France would “honor its agreements with a friendly and legitimate government.” The airbase at Hadji Kossei near the capital, N’Djamena, has a small but impressive squadron of planes, including Mirage fighters. Chadian troops take advantage of intelligence gathered by these fighters and intelligence leaked from the French embassy. Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie insists the support is only logistical, but some contend that French special forces may be directly engaging rebel forces.
It would be good to remember that the Chadian government headed by mr Idriss Deby Itno is a usurper governement, illegal through a coup against the lawfully elected president Yorongar in 2001. As someone once remarked: France has a tendency to support dictators. Not so surprising when one remembers that many of those dictators came to power with the support of France. (this part of the article is from blogger's hand!)
Central African Republic (CAR).
France maintains some 300 troops in the CAR capital Bangui as part of Operation Boali, charged with restructuring the local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, an African force led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, a regional body. The French Foreign Ministry claims this intervention helps stabilize the region, a precondition for resolving the conflict in nearby Darfur. But France remains unwilling to intervene in Darfur outside of a multilateral framework. French support for President François Bozizé is a major factor in his maintenance of power. Armed rebellions in the northern and central regions remain a constant threat to the capital. French forces on the ground do not officially engage the rebels, but regional experts such as François Grignon of the International Crisis Group say it’s likely “French special forces were engaged for limited but decisive operations.” The Economist reported that French fighters, attack helicopters, and special forces quashed a rebel advance on the capital Bangui in late 2006, allowing government forces to retake towns captured by rebels.
Ivory Coast.
France deploys approximately 3,000 troops—under a UN mandate—to patrol the buffer zone between the rebel-controlled northern regions and the government-controlled south. The operation is France’s largest and most controversial in Africa. Intransigence on political reforms and disarmament has slowed democratic transition, but a peace was brokered between the government and rebel forces in March 2007. French soldiers and transport aircraft are stationed in nearby Togo to support the operations in Ivory Coast. Locals tend to view French troops as an occupation force; one French observer, as quoted in the Economist, calls Ivory Coast “France’s little Iraq.”
What is the history of French intervention in Africa?
France intervened militarily in Africa nineteen times between 1962 and 1995. Most of the operations were ostensibly to protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments. Yet Professor Shaun Gregory of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in England points out that the standard for military support was contingent on an African leader’s willingness to support French interests. As France’s former colonies in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, most signed bilateral treaties pledging various degrees of military cooperation and support. Most of these treaties exist today, though some remain state secrets. France expanded these arrangements in the mid-1970s to include the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire—now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Currency links, entrenched French business interests, and close personal relationships between governing elites all contributed to the maintenance of France’s preeminence in the region from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The turning point came with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Some say that France’s humanitarian intervention there in June saved thousands of lives and stabilized the region. Critics, however, point to another French operation in April of that year, whereby a smaller force evacuated French nationals and certain “Rwandan personalities,” including some government officials who were accused of genocide. Andrew Wallis, a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, goes so far as to link military support for the Hutu regime with the slaughter that eventually occurred. The French embassy in the U.K. strongly denied the claim, saying that “France acted not only in order to prevent the tragedy, but also to mobilize the international community to come to the aid of the genocide victims.” Still, Gregory says Rwanda marked a turning point for French policy in francophone Africa.
How has France’s mission to Africa evolved?
Following French actions in Rwanda and a 1996-1997 crisis in Zaire in which France supported the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, a new Africa policy emerged that eschews a bilateral structure in favor of military cooperation with international forces and African regional bodies. France’s permanent bases are in the process of being ‘Europeanized,’ according to Brigadier General Dominique Trinquand, as France invites other European countries to commit forces to the bases. The placement of the bases is also consistent with the African Union’s geographical division of the continent into western, eastern, and central zones.
France conducts joint maneuvers and peacekeeping training through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and its Peacekeeping School (EMP) in Mali, which has trained over 800 African officers. These institutions intended to support the African Standing Force, a 20,000 strong rapid-response peacekeeping force projected to be ready by 2010.
Despite the move toward multilateralism, France hasn’t fully abandoned its traditional, bilateral structure. According to Radio France International, France has yet to officially revise or renegotiate the secret and public defense treaties signed with a select number of African countries. Critics charge that France uses this secrecy, as well as ambiguous definitions of what defines internal or external threats, to intervene according to its own interests. Even within an international framework, moreover, France has remained the motor of many peacekeeping operations during a period when Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a French national, has been UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. “France is still keen to exercise a leading role,” says Rachel Utley, a lecturer in international history at the University of Leeds, “while offsetting the political, military, diplomatic, and financial costs of formerly national operations.”
What factors explain this evolution?
Some experts say it was a series of political missteps in the 1990s that resulted in France's current policy on the continent. But budgetary concerns and a changing strategic climate have also pushed France toward its new multilateral approach. Structural changes in the armed forces—abandoning the draft, sharp reductions in the size of the French military, and base closures between 1997 and 2002—mean that France can no longer maintain the dominance it exercised in the 1960s and 1970s.
International terrorism has also emerged as a primary defense concern. France’s strategy is one of “prevention and projection,” which emphasizes using the smallest force possible, optimizing use of military technology, prioritizing intelligence, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which are reflected in current African deployments.
How do American and French interests in the region intersect?
While France has reduced the size of its forces in Africa, the United States is increasing its presence. In addition to the counterterrorism force in Djibouti, the United States has secured agreements with ten southern and western African nations to provide them with logistical support. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently announced plans for the creation of a separate U.S.-Africa command to oversee operations on the continent, citing unstable African regions as possible havens for terrorists. In a larger context, some experts say a permanent Africa-based U.S. command could be taken as a sign that the era of exclusively French military influence on the continent is effectively over.
afterthought:
thousands of lives have been destroyed, others threatenend by african dictators like in Chad, sudan and elsewhere, in countries where democratcy has been destroyed by the criminal western politics, of france in particular, and of the liberal crusades of the USA in general
France and the Rwanda Genocide (8)
silent acomplice
what others say about Anrew Wallis' book
the publisher:
the massac re of 1million Rwandan Tutsis by ethnic Hutus in 1994 has become a symbol of the international community's failure to prevent human rights atrocities. It is assumed that the West was well-intenioned, but ultimately ineefectual. But as Andrew walli reveals in his shocking book, on Western country -France- was secretely providing military, financial and diplomatic supprt to the genocidaires all along. Based on new interviews with key players and eye-witnesses and previously unreleased documents, Wallis'book tells a story which many have suspected, but never seen set out before. France, wallis discovers, was keen to defend its influence in Africa, even if it meant complicty in genocide. "In countries like that, genocide is not so important" as former French president francois Mitterand once said.
Wallis reveals that the french role went far beyond arms deals with the pro-Hutu Habyarimana goverment. Both before and during the genocide, French special forces armed and trained the interahamwe paramilitaries who carried out most of the killing. French vehicles and helicopters were used to transport the genocidaires up and down the country. And, as Wallis discovers, France's much-vaunted "humanitarian intervention"in the aftermath of the gencide was publicly welcomed as a gesture of supprt by the Hutu extrmists who had incited the killing. wallis'riveting expose of the french role in one of the darkest chapters of juman history will provoke furious debate, denials and outrage.
the Sunday Times
powerfull... Wallis produces plentiful evidence that some French officers were training the Hutus how to capture an tie up prisoners, how to slit thier bellies so that their bodies would not float (in the rivers and lakes)..there is no part of the french past that needs honesty and a clean break more than this.
Romeo Dallaire, canadian general and commander of UNAMIR peace-keeping force in rwanda from 1993 to 1994
This book indicates the influence exerted by an ex-colonial power as a permanent meme=ber of the Security council. On the difficult road that so many developing countries must travel towards the rule of law and human rights, as in the case of rwanda, this interference and less than helpful involvement in the denouncement of a civil war and genocide by diffrent levels of the french governemt is a reflexion of self-interest and inept use of what should have been the moral authority of a world power.
france could have lead the charge to reinforce the UN mission through direct supprt to Franco-African nations that were ready to come and stop the human catastrophe and civil war. The french gvernemtn instead chase to intervene on the side of one of the most ruthless and destructive group of genocidaires in world history.
Mehdi Ba, author of Rwanda, une Genocide Francais
through the quality of his sources and the rigour of his analysis, Andrew Wallis
renders France's complicity in the rwandan genocide undeniable.
the Independent
..furiously hard-hitting and thoroughly researched...
what others say about Anrew Wallis' book
the publisher:
the massac re of 1million Rwandan Tutsis by ethnic Hutus in 1994 has become a symbol of the international community's failure to prevent human rights atrocities. It is assumed that the West was well-intenioned, but ultimately ineefectual. But as Andrew walli reveals in his shocking book, on Western country -France- was secretely providing military, financial and diplomatic supprt to the genocidaires all along. Based on new interviews with key players and eye-witnesses and previously unreleased documents, Wallis'book tells a story which many have suspected, but never seen set out before. France, wallis discovers, was keen to defend its influence in Africa, even if it meant complicty in genocide. "In countries like that, genocide is not so important" as former French president francois Mitterand once said.
Wallis reveals that the french role went far beyond arms deals with the pro-Hutu Habyarimana goverment. Both before and during the genocide, French special forces armed and trained the interahamwe paramilitaries who carried out most of the killing. French vehicles and helicopters were used to transport the genocidaires up and down the country. And, as Wallis discovers, France's much-vaunted "humanitarian intervention"in the aftermath of the gencide was publicly welcomed as a gesture of supprt by the Hutu extrmists who had incited the killing. wallis'riveting expose of the french role in one of the darkest chapters of juman history will provoke furious debate, denials and outrage.
the Sunday Times
powerfull... Wallis produces plentiful evidence that some French officers were training the Hutus how to capture an tie up prisoners, how to slit thier bellies so that their bodies would not float (in the rivers and lakes)..there is no part of the french past that needs honesty and a clean break more than this.
Romeo Dallaire, canadian general and commander of UNAMIR peace-keeping force in rwanda from 1993 to 1994
This book indicates the influence exerted by an ex-colonial power as a permanent meme=ber of the Security council. On the difficult road that so many developing countries must travel towards the rule of law and human rights, as in the case of rwanda, this interference and less than helpful involvement in the denouncement of a civil war and genocide by diffrent levels of the french governemt is a reflexion of self-interest and inept use of what should have been the moral authority of a world power.
france could have lead the charge to reinforce the UN mission through direct supprt to Franco-African nations that were ready to come and stop the human catastrophe and civil war. The french gvernemtn instead chase to intervene on the side of one of the most ruthless and destructive group of genocidaires in world history.
Mehdi Ba, author of Rwanda, une Genocide Francais
through the quality of his sources and the rigour of his analysis, Andrew Wallis
renders France's complicity in the rwandan genocide undeniable.
the Independent
..furiously hard-hitting and thoroughly researched...
France and the Rwanda genocide (7)
Severed diplomatic relations created “information gap”
Andrew Wallis 1st-May 2007
Kigali - Researcher and journalist Andrew Wallis has said the severing of diplomatic relations between Rwanda and France has resulted into crucial sources of information on France ’s role in the Genocide to withhold it in silence, RNA reports.
Testifying before the Mucyo Commission Monday, Mr. Wallis who has authored a damning book on French role in the Genocide said all his contacts in the French political, military and academic establishment have declined to answer his requests for more information. He is author of ‘Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France ’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide’.
Mr. Wallis revealed that before the break up of diplomatic relations, he had a “contact” in the French Ministry of Defense and another with the Paris Foundation for Strategic Research (Foundation Pour la Recherche Stratégique de Paris), a think-tank that has associated closely with the chaotic French foreign policy.
When France/Rwanda relations finally ended though they had been problematic as information begun coming through about what the French did in Rwanda and in most of their colonies, Wallis said, “various emails (to the contacts) have gone unanswered”.
According to him, since he started his research at Bradford University (UK) in 1998, he had established from the same contacts that the French Defense Ministry was “cut out completely” from any military policy in Rwanda .
Instead as Wallis explained from his contacts, all policy on Africa and Rwanda specifically was controlled “directly” and “tightly” by the Elysée Palace , office of then President Mitterrand.
He said from the period that France got involved directly in support of the Habyarimana government, “only 2 speeches” were made by President Mitterrand about Rwanda . This, Wallis said was “deliberate” to keep a “media blackout” and avoid any public discussion of the French campaigns.
Mr. Wallis also told the commission that based on information from the same sources, he managed to understand President Mitterrand as one that had a “cynical view” of Africa in that the Rwandan Genocide was presented just like the usual conflicts common with primitive Africans.
“President Mitterrand had the belief that the end would justify the means ... So it made no difference whatever was happening in Rwanda”, Wallis, the only English speaking witness so far to testify to the Mucyo commission said.
According to the British academic, the RPF campaign launched in 1990 was viewed by Mitterrand and his close advisers as interference into French territory by the Anglo-Saxons “including America ”.
The British journalist also traced French role in Rwanda culminating into the Genocide back to the Fashoda incident of 1892. Following months of a military stand-off between France and Britain in Sudan , the French disgracefully retreated leaving the British in control of the area ( Sudan and later Egypt ).
According to Mr. Wallis, the French political and military establishment has “never” come to terms with such a defeat. And indeed, as he explained, they believed the “Anglo-Saxons” were behind the RPF rebels thereby supporting the Habyarimana regime “under whatever cost”.
Wallis said the French military feels the world has become a “battle ground” between France and the Anglo-Saxons. He also explained that French policy in Rwanda was guided by “franco-Anglosaxon rivalry...geopolitical realities...and as a fulfillment of personal relationship between Habyarimana and Mitterrand”.
Asked to assess the level of Genocide revisionism and negationism in France , Andrew Willis also told the commission that the phenomenon was “increasing rather than lessening” in France and French speaking Canada . Apparently “a lot” of material is circulating because the authors feel threatened now that the world knows a lot about what happened in Rwanda .
He also said he had tried unsuccessfully to contact known notorious French mercenary Paul Barril and President Mitterrand’s son Jean Christopher. Describing Barril as “dangerous”, Wallis narrated how President Mitterrand used Capt Barril to often “destabilize the RPF rebels” and later to aid the defeated Genocidal forces in Zaire (D R Congo).
Reading from a well prepared document on his laptop, researcher Wallis also explained the relationship between the Mitterrand and Habyarimana families describing it as “warm”.
He said just as President Habyarimana shared “warm” relations with Mitterrand, Agathe (Habyarimana) was very close to Danielle (Mitterrand) as was Jean-Pierre Habyarimana (Habyarimana son) with Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (Mitterrand son).
Andrew Wallis 1st-May 2007
Kigali - Researcher and journalist Andrew Wallis has said the severing of diplomatic relations between Rwanda and France has resulted into crucial sources of information on France ’s role in the Genocide to withhold it in silence, RNA reports.
Testifying before the Mucyo Commission Monday, Mr. Wallis who has authored a damning book on French role in the Genocide said all his contacts in the French political, military and academic establishment have declined to answer his requests for more information. He is author of ‘Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France ’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide’.
Mr. Wallis revealed that before the break up of diplomatic relations, he had a “contact” in the French Ministry of Defense and another with the Paris Foundation for Strategic Research (Foundation Pour la Recherche Stratégique de Paris), a think-tank that has associated closely with the chaotic French foreign policy.
When France/Rwanda relations finally ended though they had been problematic as information begun coming through about what the French did in Rwanda and in most of their colonies, Wallis said, “various emails (to the contacts) have gone unanswered”.
According to him, since he started his research at Bradford University (UK) in 1998, he had established from the same contacts that the French Defense Ministry was “cut out completely” from any military policy in Rwanda .
Instead as Wallis explained from his contacts, all policy on Africa and Rwanda specifically was controlled “directly” and “tightly” by the Elysée Palace , office of then President Mitterrand.
He said from the period that France got involved directly in support of the Habyarimana government, “only 2 speeches” were made by President Mitterrand about Rwanda . This, Wallis said was “deliberate” to keep a “media blackout” and avoid any public discussion of the French campaigns.
Mr. Wallis also told the commission that based on information from the same sources, he managed to understand President Mitterrand as one that had a “cynical view” of Africa in that the Rwandan Genocide was presented just like the usual conflicts common with primitive Africans.
“President Mitterrand had the belief that the end would justify the means ... So it made no difference whatever was happening in Rwanda”, Wallis, the only English speaking witness so far to testify to the Mucyo commission said.
According to the British academic, the RPF campaign launched in 1990 was viewed by Mitterrand and his close advisers as interference into French territory by the Anglo-Saxons “including America ”.
The British journalist also traced French role in Rwanda culminating into the Genocide back to the Fashoda incident of 1892. Following months of a military stand-off between France and Britain in Sudan , the French disgracefully retreated leaving the British in control of the area ( Sudan and later Egypt ).
According to Mr. Wallis, the French political and military establishment has “never” come to terms with such a defeat. And indeed, as he explained, they believed the “Anglo-Saxons” were behind the RPF rebels thereby supporting the Habyarimana regime “under whatever cost”.
Wallis said the French military feels the world has become a “battle ground” between France and the Anglo-Saxons. He also explained that French policy in Rwanda was guided by “franco-Anglosaxon rivalry...geopolitical realities...and as a fulfillment of personal relationship between Habyarimana and Mitterrand”.
Asked to assess the level of Genocide revisionism and negationism in France , Andrew Willis also told the commission that the phenomenon was “increasing rather than lessening” in France and French speaking Canada . Apparently “a lot” of material is circulating because the authors feel threatened now that the world knows a lot about what happened in Rwanda .
He also said he had tried unsuccessfully to contact known notorious French mercenary Paul Barril and President Mitterrand’s son Jean Christopher. Describing Barril as “dangerous”, Wallis narrated how President Mitterrand used Capt Barril to often “destabilize the RPF rebels” and later to aid the defeated Genocidal forces in Zaire (D R Congo).
Reading from a well prepared document on his laptop, researcher Wallis also explained the relationship between the Mitterrand and Habyarimana families describing it as “warm”.
He said just as President Habyarimana shared “warm” relations with Mitterrand, Agathe (Habyarimana) was very close to Danielle (Mitterrand) as was Jean-Pierre Habyarimana (Habyarimana son) with Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (Mitterrand son).
France's role in the Rwandan genocide (6)
October 2007
For decades before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda, the tiny central African country only slightly larger than Gauteng, was famous only for its mountain gorillas that drew millions of tourists for short visits. But all this changed when nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred in what the West readily declared was an ethnic war.
For 13 years after the genocide, organisations and countries came forward to apologise for sitting back while the massacre unfolded; the UN was the first to admit liability for failing to send in enough peace-keepers to protect women, children and the weak.
One prevailing conception has been that the genocide was triggered by the downing of a plane flying former president Juvenal Habyarimana from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, but new evidence proves otherwise
For decades before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda, the tiny central African country only slightly larger than Gauteng, was famous only for its mountain gorillas that drew millions of tourists for short visits. But all this changed when nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred in what the West readily declared was an ethnic war.
For 13 years after the genocide, organisations and countries came forward to apologise for sitting back while the massacre unfolded; the UN was the first to admit liability for failing to send in enough peace-keepers to protect women, children and the weak.
One prevailing conception has been that the genocide was triggered by the downing of a plane flying former president Juvenal Habyarimana from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, but new evidence proves otherwise.
In his book, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide, Andrew Wallis, a freelance journalist and a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, exposes the darkest secrets of the genocide.
In his preface Wallis comments: “My interest was heightened when I discovered that behind this Rwandan government (of Habyarimana), with its increasing catalogue of human rights abuses, lay the unconditional support of a permanent member of the Security Council and a nation (France) that prided itself on democracy and the ‘rights of man’.
“While in France individuals and pressure groups such as Survie have worked tirelessly to bring the truth to light, the English-speaking world has largely ignored the collusion of ‘one of its own’ in this shameful matter.”
The shameful matter Wallis is referring to is the revelation that between 1990 and 1994, France sent more than $24m worth of arms to Habyarimana’s government. And, in the same period, President François Mitterrand, in his quest to see France reestablish itself in central Africa, offered specialized training to Habyarimana’s Interahamwe militia – which later committed most of the killings.
Despite having been a Belgian colony, by 1990 Rwanda was a fully fledged member of “La Francafrique”. The attacks mounted by English-speaking Paul Kagame’s Rwanda Patriotic Front, mainly from Uganda, were thus feared as involving a possible takeover by Anglophone influences.
“It is no longer excusable for Western nations to write off African conflicts as ‘ethnic wars’, and to rekindle the usual racist arguments that such violence is to be expected from ‘uncivilized’ and ‘black’ peoples,” writes Wallis.
One man who has suffered enormous trauma as a result of the genocide is the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. The general, who was in charge of the small UN Force in Rwanda, has repeatedly and publicly admitted to his own failure to save those who were killed.
Wallis quotes from the general’s 2004 speech made when he returned to Rwanda to mark the tenth anniversary of the genocide, “The world is ruled by a belief that will permit other genocides. The superpowers had no interest in you; they were only interested in Yugoslavia. Thousands upon thousands of soldiers were sent there, and here I barely had 450. The guiding principle was that in Rwanda it’s tribalism, it’s history repeating itself.
“In Yugoslavia, it’s different. It’s ethnic cleansing.It’s European security. It’s white. Rwanda is black. It’s in the middle of Africa. It has no strategic value. And all that’s there, they told me, are people, and there are too many anyway.”
What the general was never told was that among the Interahamwe militia were highly trained French Special Forces who were providing logistical support (channelling the arms, including the machetes used in the killings and training). Wallis reveals that it all began in 1981 when Mitterrand was elected to the Elysee Palace.
He writes: “For his son Jean-Christophe, his father’s election to the Elysee in 1981 was like winning the lottery. Within five years, this little-known journalist was parachuted into one of the top jobs in France. Six years later, he ignominiously left the post as head of the presidential Africa Cell after insinuations of corruption and malpractice. By the end of the decade, he was under investigation for illegal arms trafficking and money laundering; he spent Christmas 2000 in a prison cell.”
After dropping out of university at 23, Wallis reveals, Jean-Christophe (nicknamed Papa m’a dit – Daddy told me) worked briefly on a kibbutz before trying a career in journalism with Agence France-Presse (AFP) before his father appointed him to head the African Cell at the Elysée, where part of his work was advising his father on the so-called “black continent”.
The book shows pretty clearly why Kofi Annan, as UN Under-Secretary General in charge of humanitarian affairs, could do nothing. It further explains why the other members of the Security Council took their time before declaring that what had happened was genocide.
In his conclusion, Wallis quotes from President Jacques Chirac’s 16 July 1995 speech to mark the first annual memorial day for the Jews deported and murdered under the Vichy regime: “On this day [in 1942] France, the country of light, and the rights of man, land of welcome and refuge, carried out an irreparable act. Abandoning its word, it delivered its protected people to their torturers. These dark hours have sullied our history forever and are an insult to our past and traditions... we must recognise the fault of the past and the faults committed by the state.”
Says Wallis: “It remains to be seen when a president of the French Republic will ever have the courage to make the same speech about Rwanda.”
For decades before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda, the tiny central African country only slightly larger than Gauteng, was famous only for its mountain gorillas that drew millions of tourists for short visits. But all this changed when nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred in what the West readily declared was an ethnic war.
For 13 years after the genocide, organisations and countries came forward to apologise for sitting back while the massacre unfolded; the UN was the first to admit liability for failing to send in enough peace-keepers to protect women, children and the weak.
One prevailing conception has been that the genocide was triggered by the downing of a plane flying former president Juvenal Habyarimana from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, but new evidence proves otherwise
For decades before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda, the tiny central African country only slightly larger than Gauteng, was famous only for its mountain gorillas that drew millions of tourists for short visits. But all this changed when nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred in what the West readily declared was an ethnic war.
For 13 years after the genocide, organisations and countries came forward to apologise for sitting back while the massacre unfolded; the UN was the first to admit liability for failing to send in enough peace-keepers to protect women, children and the weak.
One prevailing conception has been that the genocide was triggered by the downing of a plane flying former president Juvenal Habyarimana from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, but new evidence proves otherwise.
In his book, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide, Andrew Wallis, a freelance journalist and a researcher at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, exposes the darkest secrets of the genocide.
In his preface Wallis comments: “My interest was heightened when I discovered that behind this Rwandan government (of Habyarimana), with its increasing catalogue of human rights abuses, lay the unconditional support of a permanent member of the Security Council and a nation (France) that prided itself on democracy and the ‘rights of man’.
“While in France individuals and pressure groups such as Survie have worked tirelessly to bring the truth to light, the English-speaking world has largely ignored the collusion of ‘one of its own’ in this shameful matter.”
The shameful matter Wallis is referring to is the revelation that between 1990 and 1994, France sent more than $24m worth of arms to Habyarimana’s government. And, in the same period, President François Mitterrand, in his quest to see France reestablish itself in central Africa, offered specialized training to Habyarimana’s Interahamwe militia – which later committed most of the killings.
Despite having been a Belgian colony, by 1990 Rwanda was a fully fledged member of “La Francafrique”. The attacks mounted by English-speaking Paul Kagame’s Rwanda Patriotic Front, mainly from Uganda, were thus feared as involving a possible takeover by Anglophone influences.
“It is no longer excusable for Western nations to write off African conflicts as ‘ethnic wars’, and to rekindle the usual racist arguments that such violence is to be expected from ‘uncivilized’ and ‘black’ peoples,” writes Wallis.
One man who has suffered enormous trauma as a result of the genocide is the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. The general, who was in charge of the small UN Force in Rwanda, has repeatedly and publicly admitted to his own failure to save those who were killed.
Wallis quotes from the general’s 2004 speech made when he returned to Rwanda to mark the tenth anniversary of the genocide, “The world is ruled by a belief that will permit other genocides. The superpowers had no interest in you; they were only interested in Yugoslavia. Thousands upon thousands of soldiers were sent there, and here I barely had 450. The guiding principle was that in Rwanda it’s tribalism, it’s history repeating itself.
“In Yugoslavia, it’s different. It’s ethnic cleansing.It’s European security. It’s white. Rwanda is black. It’s in the middle of Africa. It has no strategic value. And all that’s there, they told me, are people, and there are too many anyway.”
What the general was never told was that among the Interahamwe militia were highly trained French Special Forces who were providing logistical support (channelling the arms, including the machetes used in the killings and training). Wallis reveals that it all began in 1981 when Mitterrand was elected to the Elysee Palace.
He writes: “For his son Jean-Christophe, his father’s election to the Elysee in 1981 was like winning the lottery. Within five years, this little-known journalist was parachuted into one of the top jobs in France. Six years later, he ignominiously left the post as head of the presidential Africa Cell after insinuations of corruption and malpractice. By the end of the decade, he was under investigation for illegal arms trafficking and money laundering; he spent Christmas 2000 in a prison cell.”
After dropping out of university at 23, Wallis reveals, Jean-Christophe (nicknamed Papa m’a dit – Daddy told me) worked briefly on a kibbutz before trying a career in journalism with Agence France-Presse (AFP) before his father appointed him to head the African Cell at the Elysée, where part of his work was advising his father on the so-called “black continent”.
The book shows pretty clearly why Kofi Annan, as UN Under-Secretary General in charge of humanitarian affairs, could do nothing. It further explains why the other members of the Security Council took their time before declaring that what had happened was genocide.
In his conclusion, Wallis quotes from President Jacques Chirac’s 16 July 1995 speech to mark the first annual memorial day for the Jews deported and murdered under the Vichy regime: “On this day [in 1942] France, the country of light, and the rights of man, land of welcome and refuge, carried out an irreparable act. Abandoning its word, it delivered its protected people to their torturers. These dark hours have sullied our history forever and are an insult to our past and traditions... we must recognise the fault of the past and the faults committed by the state.”
Says Wallis: “It remains to be seen when a president of the French Republic will ever have the courage to make the same speech about Rwanda.”
woensdag 7 november 2007
France and the Rwanda Genocide (5)
Turquoise, hiérarchie des responsabilités, conclusions provisoires
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 26 mars 2004
Dernière journée : Turquoise, hiérarchie des responsabilités, conclusions provisoires
Turquoise dans une logique de guerre, des responsabilités qui se précisent, de nouvelles pièces à conviction et de premières conclusions
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné vendredi matin l'opération Turquoise. Les documents rassemblés, les témoignages de Colette Braeckman et Alison Des Forges, les récits des journalistes, dont Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, et les témoignages des rescapés dessinent de cette opération un visage aux antipodes de l'humanitaire officiel : la logique de guerre était dominante, et quand elle a échoué, l'armée française a favorisé, sinon coorganisé, le repli de ses alliés génocidaires vers l'est du Zaïre sous le couvert d'un bouclier humain, la foule conduite et installée dans les camps du Kivu - futur vivier d'une guerre de reconquête. Seul le camp de Kibeho, alimenté en miliciens, a été laissé tel un abcès de fixation en territoire " ennemi ". Un médecin militaire qui entendait exercer son métier s'est fait rabrouer par un officier de Turquoise : " Tu n'as pas encore compris que ce que nous faisions n'avait rien d'humanitaire ? "
De même, l'examen détaillé du " sauvetage " des survivants de Bisesero montre que ceux-ci ont été en fait abandonnés aux assauts des miliciens durant trois jours. Un assaut dont un certain nombre de témoins affirment qu'il aurait été favorisé par les manœuvres de militaires français.
Examinant les responsabilités officielles dans la " mise entre parenthèses du génocide, sa subordination à la guerre et aux schémas ethnistes, la Commission a relevé les responsabilités officielles et réelles du Président Mitterrand, du chef d'État-major l'amiral Lanxade, des généraux Quesnot et Huchon. Mais elle s'est aussi interrogée sur le rôle des généraux Jeannou Lacaze et Jean Heinrich, anciens chefs du service Action de la DGSE : le premier se trouvait apparemment au côté du général Huchon à la Mission militaire de la Coopération ; le second, Directeur du Renseignement militaire, aurait fait plus que du renseignement selon un document inédit.
Il a aussi été question du rôle de Jean-Christophe Mitterrand. Un témoin, le journaliste Gaëtan Sebudandi, a expliqué comment il avait découvert des liens d'affaires du fils de François Mitterrand avec le fils du président Habyarimana, Jean-Pierre, et l'homme d'affaires Félicien Kabuga, qui deviendra la " trésorier " présumé du génocide, dans une grande propriété agricole près de la frontière ougandaise. Plusieurs autres implications ont été évoquées, mais elles doivent, comme la précédente, être vérifiées à partir des précisions fournies.
La Commission a achevé ses travaux avec la révélation par le journaliste Mehdi Ba de l'existence d'une série de documents accablants. Un seul exemple : le 1er septembre 2004, un semestre après le début du génocide, une note interne au ministère de la Coopération s'interrogeait sur l'éventuelle fourniture de visas à une liste de 16 personnes, dont certains des hauts responsables du génocide, pour " préparer l'avenir "…
Un nouveau témoignage du Rwanda a été projeté d'une rescapée du camp de Nyarushishi : elle a accusé des militaires de l'opération Turquoise chargés de la garde du camp, de multiples viols et d'avoir livré d'autres rescapés aux miliciens.
La Commission a entendu toute la semaine trop de témoignages accablants : la vérité doit être faite à leur sujet. La Commission d'enquête citoyenne a présenté à la presse ses conclusions provisoires. Elle demande d'ores et déjà :
- que soient examinées avec sérieux la somme d'éléments pouvant laisser présumer l'implication active de certains Français, responsables ou subalternes, dans le génocide des Tutsi en 1994 ; l'impunité en ce domaine n'est pas envisageable ; si ces éléments étaient confirmés, la saisine des instances judiciaires serait nécessaire, qu'il s'agisse du Tribunal pénal international d'Arusha ou de la justice française ;
- que des députés exercent aussi leur rôle constitutionnel de contrôle de l'exécutif, sans se contenter des résultats d'une Mission d'information parlementaire qui a esquivé les sujets les plus sensibles ; sur le thème du rôle de la France dans le génocide de 1994, l'information du Parlement ne peut être considérée comme close ;
- que les partis politiques et le mouvement citoyen considèrent la dangerosité d'évolutions organisationnelles récentes, telle la constitution du Commandement des opérations spéciales en une sorte de " légion présidentielle " ;
- que la France, dans ses rapports avec le peuple rwandais, se dispose à tirer les conséquences de ceux de ses actes qui seront avérés, parmi ceux qu'a évoqués la Commission ou qui pourraient encore se révéler.
La Commission n'entend pas en rester là. Ses travaux seront diffusés sous diverses formes (écrit, son, image), ils feront l'objet d'un rapport, et pourront donner lieu à des " compléments d'information ".
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne a été organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armements et Survie). Elle a été présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y ont également participé l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 26 mars 2004
Dernière journée : Turquoise, hiérarchie des responsabilités, conclusions provisoires
Turquoise dans une logique de guerre, des responsabilités qui se précisent, de nouvelles pièces à conviction et de premières conclusions
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné vendredi matin l'opération Turquoise. Les documents rassemblés, les témoignages de Colette Braeckman et Alison Des Forges, les récits des journalistes, dont Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, et les témoignages des rescapés dessinent de cette opération un visage aux antipodes de l'humanitaire officiel : la logique de guerre était dominante, et quand elle a échoué, l'armée française a favorisé, sinon coorganisé, le repli de ses alliés génocidaires vers l'est du Zaïre sous le couvert d'un bouclier humain, la foule conduite et installée dans les camps du Kivu - futur vivier d'une guerre de reconquête. Seul le camp de Kibeho, alimenté en miliciens, a été laissé tel un abcès de fixation en territoire " ennemi ". Un médecin militaire qui entendait exercer son métier s'est fait rabrouer par un officier de Turquoise : " Tu n'as pas encore compris que ce que nous faisions n'avait rien d'humanitaire ? "
De même, l'examen détaillé du " sauvetage " des survivants de Bisesero montre que ceux-ci ont été en fait abandonnés aux assauts des miliciens durant trois jours. Un assaut dont un certain nombre de témoins affirment qu'il aurait été favorisé par les manœuvres de militaires français.
Examinant les responsabilités officielles dans la " mise entre parenthèses du génocide, sa subordination à la guerre et aux schémas ethnistes, la Commission a relevé les responsabilités officielles et réelles du Président Mitterrand, du chef d'État-major l'amiral Lanxade, des généraux Quesnot et Huchon. Mais elle s'est aussi interrogée sur le rôle des généraux Jeannou Lacaze et Jean Heinrich, anciens chefs du service Action de la DGSE : le premier se trouvait apparemment au côté du général Huchon à la Mission militaire de la Coopération ; le second, Directeur du Renseignement militaire, aurait fait plus que du renseignement selon un document inédit.
Il a aussi été question du rôle de Jean-Christophe Mitterrand. Un témoin, le journaliste Gaëtan Sebudandi, a expliqué comment il avait découvert des liens d'affaires du fils de François Mitterrand avec le fils du président Habyarimana, Jean-Pierre, et l'homme d'affaires Félicien Kabuga, qui deviendra la " trésorier " présumé du génocide, dans une grande propriété agricole près de la frontière ougandaise. Plusieurs autres implications ont été évoquées, mais elles doivent, comme la précédente, être vérifiées à partir des précisions fournies.
La Commission a achevé ses travaux avec la révélation par le journaliste Mehdi Ba de l'existence d'une série de documents accablants. Un seul exemple : le 1er septembre 2004, un semestre après le début du génocide, une note interne au ministère de la Coopération s'interrogeait sur l'éventuelle fourniture de visas à une liste de 16 personnes, dont certains des hauts responsables du génocide, pour " préparer l'avenir "…
Un nouveau témoignage du Rwanda a été projeté d'une rescapée du camp de Nyarushishi : elle a accusé des militaires de l'opération Turquoise chargés de la garde du camp, de multiples viols et d'avoir livré d'autres rescapés aux miliciens.
La Commission a entendu toute la semaine trop de témoignages accablants : la vérité doit être faite à leur sujet. La Commission d'enquête citoyenne a présenté à la presse ses conclusions provisoires. Elle demande d'ores et déjà :
- que soient examinées avec sérieux la somme d'éléments pouvant laisser présumer l'implication active de certains Français, responsables ou subalternes, dans le génocide des Tutsi en 1994 ; l'impunité en ce domaine n'est pas envisageable ; si ces éléments étaient confirmés, la saisine des instances judiciaires serait nécessaire, qu'il s'agisse du Tribunal pénal international d'Arusha ou de la justice française ;
- que des députés exercent aussi leur rôle constitutionnel de contrôle de l'exécutif, sans se contenter des résultats d'une Mission d'information parlementaire qui a esquivé les sujets les plus sensibles ; sur le thème du rôle de la France dans le génocide de 1994, l'information du Parlement ne peut être considérée comme close ;
- que les partis politiques et le mouvement citoyen considèrent la dangerosité d'évolutions organisationnelles récentes, telle la constitution du Commandement des opérations spéciales en une sorte de " légion présidentielle " ;
- que la France, dans ses rapports avec le peuple rwandais, se dispose à tirer les conséquences de ceux de ses actes qui seront avérés, parmi ceux qu'a évoqués la Commission ou qui pourraient encore se révéler.
La Commission n'entend pas en rester là. Ses travaux seront diffusés sous diverses formes (écrit, son, image), ils feront l'objet d'un rapport, et pourront donner lieu à des " compléments d'information ".
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne a été organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armements et Survie). Elle a été présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y ont également participé l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
France and the Rwanda Genocide (4)
le rôle des médias et de l'idéologie
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 25 mars 2004
Quatrième journée sur le rôle des médias et de l'idéologie
La presse entre meilleur et pire, la propagande ethniste, des témoignages insoutenables
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné ce jeudi l'attitude de la presse française durant le génocide, les influences qu'elle a subies ou contre lesquelles elle a résisté. Annie Faure, médecin au Rwanda en 1994, et Yves Ternon, historien, ont scruté durant cette période l'intégrale des articles du Figaro, du Monde, de La Croix, la plupart des articles de Libération, de larges extraits de L'Humanité. Ils ont aussi effectué des sondages plus ou moins importants dans les autres quotidiens et un certain nombre d'hebdomadaires. Ils ont constaté que la plupart des envoyés spéciaux, saisis par la dimension des massacres, ont après un délai d'adaptation plus ou moins bref tenu à informer librement de ce qu'ils voyaient et entendaient, faisant preuve de courage et de lucidité. Mais assez souvent, la qualité de leurs articles s'est trouvée en porte-à-faux avec les éditoriaux, les encarts, le titrage. Les principaux quotidiens n'ont pas échappé, même pendant l'opération Turquoise, à la contagion du discours ethniste - souvent dans sa version la plus absurde, nilotique et hamite -, alors que, dans les mêmes colonnes, une explication scientifique de la fabrication de l'ethnisme avait parfois été donnée par l'un ou l'autre spécialiste.
S'agissant de l'emploi décisif du mot " génocide ", il y a un grand écart entre son apparition le 11 avril dans Libération (quatre jours seulement après le début des massacres) et le 8 juin seulement dans Le Monde (où, selon un témoignage, le terme était auparavant censuré). La Commission a salué le travail du premier de ces deux quotidiens, mais aussi de L'Humanité et du Nouvel Observateur. Avec l'historien Jean-Pierre Chrétien, la CEC a repéré le développement, dès 1993 et jusque après le génocide, des thèmes de propagande distillés par les Services français. Il s'agissait notamment de diaboliser le FPR, ennemi de la France puis du camp génocidaire : ce mouvement était qualifié de " Khmers noirs ", muni du plan de conquête d'un " empire hima-tutsi ", etc. La CEC a observé la préparation et la résurgence de la thèse du " double génocide ".
L'attitude de la presse belge a été évoquée avec Colette Braeckman, qui a aussi confirmé plusieurs points, dont la constitution à l'ambassade de France du gouvernement intérimaire qui allait superviser le génocide, et le mépris affiché par les officiers français envers leurs homologues rwandais voulant se désolidariser de l'armée génocidaire. Sur la question de l'attentat du 6 avril 1994 contre l'avion du président Habyarimana, la journaliste belge, spécialiste du sujet, n'exclut aucune hypothèse mais estime que de forts indices subsistent en faveur d'un coup d'État commandité accompli par le camp des extrémistes hutu.
Jean-Christophe Rufin, qui était conseiller du ministre de la Défense François Léotard, a apporté son témoignage sur la conception de l'opération Turquoise (à examiner vendredi). Il a insisté sur le fait que, pour une partie de l'exécutif, elle comportait une dimension réellement humanitaire, sans exclure que cette dimension ait été englobée dans d'autres objectifs dont il n'était pas informé.
En fin de journée, deux témoignages de rescapés filmés au Rwanda ont, une fois encore, porté de très graves accusations : il s'agit cette fois du camp de rescapés de Nyarushishi, où les soldats français de Turquoise se seraient rendus auteurs ou complices de viols ou de sévices sur la personne de survivants, en connivence avec des miliciens auxquels ils auraient livré régulièrement des victimes. La veille, un ancien chef milicien avait apporté un témoignage concordant. L'accumulation de témoignages reçus évoquant un partage de l'idéologie génocidaire et une complicité criminelle par certains éléments de Turquoise devient telle que la nécessité d'une enquête approfondie s'impose de plus en plus.
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 25 mars 2004
Quatrième journée sur le rôle des médias et de l'idéologie
La presse entre meilleur et pire, la propagande ethniste, des témoignages insoutenables
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné ce jeudi l'attitude de la presse française durant le génocide, les influences qu'elle a subies ou contre lesquelles elle a résisté. Annie Faure, médecin au Rwanda en 1994, et Yves Ternon, historien, ont scruté durant cette période l'intégrale des articles du Figaro, du Monde, de La Croix, la plupart des articles de Libération, de larges extraits de L'Humanité. Ils ont aussi effectué des sondages plus ou moins importants dans les autres quotidiens et un certain nombre d'hebdomadaires. Ils ont constaté que la plupart des envoyés spéciaux, saisis par la dimension des massacres, ont après un délai d'adaptation plus ou moins bref tenu à informer librement de ce qu'ils voyaient et entendaient, faisant preuve de courage et de lucidité. Mais assez souvent, la qualité de leurs articles s'est trouvée en porte-à-faux avec les éditoriaux, les encarts, le titrage. Les principaux quotidiens n'ont pas échappé, même pendant l'opération Turquoise, à la contagion du discours ethniste - souvent dans sa version la plus absurde, nilotique et hamite -, alors que, dans les mêmes colonnes, une explication scientifique de la fabrication de l'ethnisme avait parfois été donnée par l'un ou l'autre spécialiste.
S'agissant de l'emploi décisif du mot " génocide ", il y a un grand écart entre son apparition le 11 avril dans Libération (quatre jours seulement après le début des massacres) et le 8 juin seulement dans Le Monde (où, selon un témoignage, le terme était auparavant censuré). La Commission a salué le travail du premier de ces deux quotidiens, mais aussi de L'Humanité et du Nouvel Observateur. Avec l'historien Jean-Pierre Chrétien, la CEC a repéré le développement, dès 1993 et jusque après le génocide, des thèmes de propagande distillés par les Services français. Il s'agissait notamment de diaboliser le FPR, ennemi de la France puis du camp génocidaire : ce mouvement était qualifié de " Khmers noirs ", muni du plan de conquête d'un " empire hima-tutsi ", etc. La CEC a observé la préparation et la résurgence de la thèse du " double génocide ".
L'attitude de la presse belge a été évoquée avec Colette Braeckman, qui a aussi confirmé plusieurs points, dont la constitution à l'ambassade de France du gouvernement intérimaire qui allait superviser le génocide, et le mépris affiché par les officiers français envers leurs homologues rwandais voulant se désolidariser de l'armée génocidaire. Sur la question de l'attentat du 6 avril 1994 contre l'avion du président Habyarimana, la journaliste belge, spécialiste du sujet, n'exclut aucune hypothèse mais estime que de forts indices subsistent en faveur d'un coup d'État commandité accompli par le camp des extrémistes hutu.
Jean-Christophe Rufin, qui était conseiller du ministre de la Défense François Léotard, a apporté son témoignage sur la conception de l'opération Turquoise (à examiner vendredi). Il a insisté sur le fait que, pour une partie de l'exécutif, elle comportait une dimension réellement humanitaire, sans exclure que cette dimension ait été englobée dans d'autres objectifs dont il n'était pas informé.
En fin de journée, deux témoignages de rescapés filmés au Rwanda ont, une fois encore, porté de très graves accusations : il s'agit cette fois du camp de rescapés de Nyarushishi, où les soldats français de Turquoise se seraient rendus auteurs ou complices de viols ou de sévices sur la personne de survivants, en connivence avec des miliciens auxquels ils auraient livré régulièrement des victimes. La veille, un ancien chef milicien avait apporté un témoignage concordant. L'accumulation de témoignages reçus évoquant un partage de l'idéologie génocidaire et une complicité criminelle par certains éléments de Turquoise devient telle que la nécessité d'une enquête approfondie s'impose de plus en plus.
France and the Rwanda Genocide (3)
aide financiere et diplomatique au genocide
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 24 mars 2004
Troisième journée consacrée aux présomptions de complicité financière et diplomatique francaises
De la Banque de France à l'Élysée et à l'ONU
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné des documents recueillis à Kigali par le sénateur belge Pierre Galand, qu'elle a longuement auditionné.
La Banque nationale du Rwanda, trésor de guerre des organisateurs du génocide, a pu tirer des sommes importantes sur la Banque de France et la BNP Paris : 2 737 119,65 FF en six prélèvements du 30 juin au 1er août pour la Banque de France, 30 488 140,35 FF en sept prélèvements du 14 au 23 juin 1994 pour la BNP. La Commission se demande comment la Banque de France a pu procurer des moyens financiers (dont 1 500 000 FF le 1er août, alors que le Gouvernement responsable du génocide et sa banque ont quitté le Rwanda depuis un mois) aux auteurs d'un génocide commencé le 7 avril; comment l'autorité de tutelle de la place financière de Paris a pu ne pas demander de couper les liens financiers avec les autorités génocidaires; comment la BNP a pu ignorer la portée de ces prélèvements.
La journaliste Colette Braeckman a confirmé dans ses travaux que, selon une source sûre, le Gouvernement intérimaire rwandais (GIR) composé de représentants des factions politiques extrémistes et qui va aussitôt superviser le génocide, aurait été constitué au sein de l'ambassade de France à Kigali, sous la houlette de l'ambassadeur Marlaud. La France va continuer de reconnaître et d'aider le GIR (qui sera jugé responsable du génocide par le Tribunal pénal international d'Arusha) durant tout le génocide et même jusque mi-juillet 1994 environ, après avoir protégé sa fuite. Le 27 avril 1994, 20 jours après le début du génocide, elle a accueilli à l'Élysée, au Quai d'Orsay et, semble-t-il, à Matignon, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du GIR Jérôme Bicamumpaka, accompagné d'un leader réputé pour son fanatisme - ce malgré les avertissements d'importantes organisations des droits de l'Homme, qui ont mis en garde l'exécutif français contre la caution ainsi apportée aux autorités en train d'administrer le génocide. Ceci a été confirmé par l'avocat et militant des droits de l'Homme bruxellois, Eric Gillet.
L'Élysée, qui disposait d'une grande influence sur le GIR, ne s'en est guère servi pour l'inciter à cesser les massacres. Le Président de la République, selon Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, et son Monsieur Afrique Bruno Delaye, selon Alison Des Forges, auraient tenu des propos marquant une indifférence quasi totale au fait qu'un génocide puisse être en train de se commettre en Afrique, comme s'il s'agissait de quelque chose de banal.
Selon Alison Des Forges, la représentation française à l'ONU, en bons termes avec celle du GIR, aurait mobilisé son influence et ses relations au siège des Nations unies pour infléchir l'information du Conseil de sécurité, favorisant la perception d'un conflit armé plutôt que celle d'un génocide en cours. Une telle présentation a été celle proposée pendant plusieurs semaines par le Secrétariat général. Elle a concouru à limiter et retarder les réactions internationales contre le génocide.
La CEC est organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armement et Survie). Elle est présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y participent également l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 24 mars 2004
Troisième journée consacrée aux présomptions de complicité financière et diplomatique francaises
De la Banque de France à l'Élysée et à l'ONU
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) a examiné des documents recueillis à Kigali par le sénateur belge Pierre Galand, qu'elle a longuement auditionné.
La Banque nationale du Rwanda, trésor de guerre des organisateurs du génocide, a pu tirer des sommes importantes sur la Banque de France et la BNP Paris : 2 737 119,65 FF en six prélèvements du 30 juin au 1er août pour la Banque de France, 30 488 140,35 FF en sept prélèvements du 14 au 23 juin 1994 pour la BNP. La Commission se demande comment la Banque de France a pu procurer des moyens financiers (dont 1 500 000 FF le 1er août, alors que le Gouvernement responsable du génocide et sa banque ont quitté le Rwanda depuis un mois) aux auteurs d'un génocide commencé le 7 avril; comment l'autorité de tutelle de la place financière de Paris a pu ne pas demander de couper les liens financiers avec les autorités génocidaires; comment la BNP a pu ignorer la portée de ces prélèvements.
La journaliste Colette Braeckman a confirmé dans ses travaux que, selon une source sûre, le Gouvernement intérimaire rwandais (GIR) composé de représentants des factions politiques extrémistes et qui va aussitôt superviser le génocide, aurait été constitué au sein de l'ambassade de France à Kigali, sous la houlette de l'ambassadeur Marlaud. La France va continuer de reconnaître et d'aider le GIR (qui sera jugé responsable du génocide par le Tribunal pénal international d'Arusha) durant tout le génocide et même jusque mi-juillet 1994 environ, après avoir protégé sa fuite. Le 27 avril 1994, 20 jours après le début du génocide, elle a accueilli à l'Élysée, au Quai d'Orsay et, semble-t-il, à Matignon, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du GIR Jérôme Bicamumpaka, accompagné d'un leader réputé pour son fanatisme - ce malgré les avertissements d'importantes organisations des droits de l'Homme, qui ont mis en garde l'exécutif français contre la caution ainsi apportée aux autorités en train d'administrer le génocide. Ceci a été confirmé par l'avocat et militant des droits de l'Homme bruxellois, Eric Gillet.
L'Élysée, qui disposait d'une grande influence sur le GIR, ne s'en est guère servi pour l'inciter à cesser les massacres. Le Président de la République, selon Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, et son Monsieur Afrique Bruno Delaye, selon Alison Des Forges, auraient tenu des propos marquant une indifférence quasi totale au fait qu'un génocide puisse être en train de se commettre en Afrique, comme s'il s'agissait de quelque chose de banal.
Selon Alison Des Forges, la représentation française à l'ONU, en bons termes avec celle du GIR, aurait mobilisé son influence et ses relations au siège des Nations unies pour infléchir l'information du Conseil de sécurité, favorisant la perception d'un conflit armé plutôt que celle d'un génocide en cours. Une telle présentation a été celle proposée pendant plusieurs semaines par le Secrétariat général. Elle a concouru à limiter et retarder les réactions internationales contre le génocide.
La CEC est organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armement et Survie). Elle est présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y participent également l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
France and the Rwanda Genocide (2)
Communiqué de presse, Paris, le 22 mars 2004
Commission d'enquête citoyenne sur le rôle de la France durant le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994
Première journée
Plusieurs témoins impliquent directement des militaires français dans le génocide
Durant les deux premières de ses cinq journées de travail, la Commission d'enquête citoyenne examine les éléments tendant à montrer une complicité active de la France dans le génocide : fourniture de moyens humains (instructeurs, organisation, appuis divers) et matériels (armes, télécommunication). Ce lundi matin, elle a entendu un témoin, Immaculée, qui a vu dès 1991 à un barrage routier tenu près de Ruhengeri par des militaires français, ceux-ci arrêter les porteurs de carte d'identité ethnique avec mention " Tutsi " et les livrer immédiatement aux miliciens, qui les massacraient aussitôt. " Les Tutsi se faisaient sortir de la voiture et les militaires français les remettaient aux mains des miliciens agacés qui les coupaient à coups de machettes et les jetaient dans une rigole (canalisation d'eau) au bord de la grande route asphaltée de Ruhengeri-Kigali. " " Dans le rétroviseur de notre Hiace-minibus, […] j'ai vu un Tutsi qui se faisait sortir d'une voiture un peu plus loin de la nôtre et après la vérification de sa carte d'identité, un militaire français et un autre officier rwandais l'ont donné aux miliciens qui ont commencé tout de suite devant ces voitures à le frapper, de leurs machettes et de toutes autres armes […] pour le jeter après dans la rigole (tout cela vite fait pour s'attaquer aux suivants). Quand j'ai vu cela, j'ai regardé autour de nous dans la rigole où j'ai aperçu quelques corps qui gisaient sans bruit ".
La Commission s'est aussi penchée sur la coopération continuée de l'armée française avec l'armée qui encadrait le génocide, pendant et après le génocide. Elle a rapproché cela des doctrines militaires de contrôle des populations enseignées depuis un demi-siècle à l'École de Guerre française, où ont été formés nombre de hauts gradés des régimes tortionnaires latino-américains, puis l'orchestrateur présumé du génocide rwandais, le colonel Théoneste Bagosora. En fin de journée, deux témoignages filmés, d'un survivant des collines de Bisesero et d'un milicien, ont fourni des indications concordantes (d'une gravité sans précédent, et dont la vérification est incontournable) sur l'implication de militaires français de l'opération Turquoise dans le massacre d'une partie des survivants. Dans le délai de trois jours entre la découverte de quelque 5 000 rescapés sur ces collines et le sauvetage de 800 survivants, sous la pression de journalistes, des soldats français et leurs hélicoptères auraient piégé environ 3 500 survivants en leur promettant de l'aide puis en laissant les miliciens venir les achever.
Ces témoignages font partie d'un ensemble qui sera projeté chaque jour vers 15h30. Ils méritent une vérification et des enquêtes complémentaires de la part de la justice et des médias. Notre pays doit faire la lumière sur ces accusations, ce qui serait d'autant plus aisé qu'il existe au Rwanda quantité d'autres témoins potentiels.
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) n'a pas fait qu'entendre des témoignages parfois bouleversants. Elle a aussi méthodiquement examiné et discuté les pièces d'un abondant dossier et entendu plusieurs experts (Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Alison Des Forges et Gabriel Périès).
La CEC est organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armements et Survie). Elle est présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y participent également l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
Commission d'enquête citoyenne sur le rôle de la France durant le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994
Première journée
Plusieurs témoins impliquent directement des militaires français dans le génocide
Durant les deux premières de ses cinq journées de travail, la Commission d'enquête citoyenne examine les éléments tendant à montrer une complicité active de la France dans le génocide : fourniture de moyens humains (instructeurs, organisation, appuis divers) et matériels (armes, télécommunication). Ce lundi matin, elle a entendu un témoin, Immaculée, qui a vu dès 1991 à un barrage routier tenu près de Ruhengeri par des militaires français, ceux-ci arrêter les porteurs de carte d'identité ethnique avec mention " Tutsi " et les livrer immédiatement aux miliciens, qui les massacraient aussitôt. " Les Tutsi se faisaient sortir de la voiture et les militaires français les remettaient aux mains des miliciens agacés qui les coupaient à coups de machettes et les jetaient dans une rigole (canalisation d'eau) au bord de la grande route asphaltée de Ruhengeri-Kigali. " " Dans le rétroviseur de notre Hiace-minibus, […] j'ai vu un Tutsi qui se faisait sortir d'une voiture un peu plus loin de la nôtre et après la vérification de sa carte d'identité, un militaire français et un autre officier rwandais l'ont donné aux miliciens qui ont commencé tout de suite devant ces voitures à le frapper, de leurs machettes et de toutes autres armes […] pour le jeter après dans la rigole (tout cela vite fait pour s'attaquer aux suivants). Quand j'ai vu cela, j'ai regardé autour de nous dans la rigole où j'ai aperçu quelques corps qui gisaient sans bruit ".
La Commission s'est aussi penchée sur la coopération continuée de l'armée française avec l'armée qui encadrait le génocide, pendant et après le génocide. Elle a rapproché cela des doctrines militaires de contrôle des populations enseignées depuis un demi-siècle à l'École de Guerre française, où ont été formés nombre de hauts gradés des régimes tortionnaires latino-américains, puis l'orchestrateur présumé du génocide rwandais, le colonel Théoneste Bagosora. En fin de journée, deux témoignages filmés, d'un survivant des collines de Bisesero et d'un milicien, ont fourni des indications concordantes (d'une gravité sans précédent, et dont la vérification est incontournable) sur l'implication de militaires français de l'opération Turquoise dans le massacre d'une partie des survivants. Dans le délai de trois jours entre la découverte de quelque 5 000 rescapés sur ces collines et le sauvetage de 800 survivants, sous la pression de journalistes, des soldats français et leurs hélicoptères auraient piégé environ 3 500 survivants en leur promettant de l'aide puis en laissant les miliciens venir les achever.
Ces témoignages font partie d'un ensemble qui sera projeté chaque jour vers 15h30. Ils méritent une vérification et des enquêtes complémentaires de la part de la justice et des médias. Notre pays doit faire la lumière sur ces accusations, ce qui serait d'autant plus aisé qu'il existe au Rwanda quantité d'autres témoins potentiels.
La Commission d'enquête citoyenne (CEC) n'a pas fait qu'entendre des témoignages parfois bouleversants. Elle a aussi méthodiquement examiné et discuté les pièces d'un abondant dossier et entendu plusieurs experts (Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Alison Des Forges et Gabriel Périès).
La CEC est organisée par plusieurs associations (Aircrige, la Cimade, l'Observatoire des transferts d'armements et Survie). Elle est présidée par le juriste Géraud de la Pradelle. Y participent également l'historien Yves Ternon, Bernard Jouanneau, avocat, et Annie Faure, médecin.
zondag 4 november 2007
UN ignores genocide in Africa
Winnipeg Sun, Nov 3, 2007
KIGALI, RWANDA -- Countries in the West are not the only states questioning the effectiveness of international organizations in preventing human rights abuses.
In Rwanda, many people have a low opinion of the United Nations.
The most obvious reason for this is many feel the UN abandoned them during the genocide in 1994. One young man I met in Kigali said he recalls people pleading with UN personnel to help them leave the country as death squads started killing. This was before the UN packed up its operations after evacuating foreign nationals first.
The UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was originally about 2,500 strong at the start of the genocide, but was reduced to 250 after the death of 10 Belgian soldiers. The international community then quibbled about who would pay for the mission as hundreds of thousands were killed, all the while avoiding the term "genocide" for fear of being required to act. The French would later send troops to establish a safe zone in the southwest.
Rwandans justifiably feel betrayed by the only organization that has a mandate to prevent human rights violations around the world. This one young man said many Rwandans feel the UN is about "spending money" and not much else. This is evident as the UN is still present in the country.
One wonders if domestic institutions are better suited to preventing genocide and promoting peace. It was, after all, the Rwandan Patriotic Front which stopped the genocide by pushing out those responsible for the killing, not the UN. Also effective are traditional Gcaca courts in Rwanda which identify and prosecute perpetrators of the genocide.
Rwanda has also established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission which seems useful in restoring peace. However, time will tell if these efforts can stand the test of time.
After all, true ethnic peace can only be achieved through changed attitudes at the individual and community level, not through government programs.
The worst part of the situation is Rwandans are witnessing another failure on the part of international organizations to secure peace elsewhere in Africa.
Many are concerned about the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and interpret it as another genocide the world is allowing to continue.
I attended a student debate on the Darfur issue at the National University of Rwanda in Butare. To many young Rwandans, the issue is crystal clear. They see it as genocide. The Arab-dominated central government is assisting Arab militias in slaughtering Black Africans in Sudan, many of whom are Christian.
To them, the world's response is chillingly familiar to what they went through. While the semantics of genocide are being debated, thousands are killed.
One student, trained in law and politics, said it seems everyone has to be killed for a consensus to develop that it is genocide.
Rather than debate genocide without direct evidence, he argued, it would make sense to agree human rights violations are occurring and to act now before genocide can actually develop.
If only the world had followed that advice in Rwanda.
KIGALI, RWANDA -- Countries in the West are not the only states questioning the effectiveness of international organizations in preventing human rights abuses.
In Rwanda, many people have a low opinion of the United Nations.
The most obvious reason for this is many feel the UN abandoned them during the genocide in 1994. One young man I met in Kigali said he recalls people pleading with UN personnel to help them leave the country as death squads started killing. This was before the UN packed up its operations after evacuating foreign nationals first.
The UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was originally about 2,500 strong at the start of the genocide, but was reduced to 250 after the death of 10 Belgian soldiers. The international community then quibbled about who would pay for the mission as hundreds of thousands were killed, all the while avoiding the term "genocide" for fear of being required to act. The French would later send troops to establish a safe zone in the southwest.
Rwandans justifiably feel betrayed by the only organization that has a mandate to prevent human rights violations around the world. This one young man said many Rwandans feel the UN is about "spending money" and not much else. This is evident as the UN is still present in the country.
One wonders if domestic institutions are better suited to preventing genocide and promoting peace. It was, after all, the Rwandan Patriotic Front which stopped the genocide by pushing out those responsible for the killing, not the UN. Also effective are traditional Gcaca courts in Rwanda which identify and prosecute perpetrators of the genocide.
Rwanda has also established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission which seems useful in restoring peace. However, time will tell if these efforts can stand the test of time.
After all, true ethnic peace can only be achieved through changed attitudes at the individual and community level, not through government programs.
The worst part of the situation is Rwandans are witnessing another failure on the part of international organizations to secure peace elsewhere in Africa.
Many are concerned about the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and interpret it as another genocide the world is allowing to continue.
I attended a student debate on the Darfur issue at the National University of Rwanda in Butare. To many young Rwandans, the issue is crystal clear. They see it as genocide. The Arab-dominated central government is assisting Arab militias in slaughtering Black Africans in Sudan, many of whom are Christian.
To them, the world's response is chillingly familiar to what they went through. While the semantics of genocide are being debated, thousands are killed.
One student, trained in law and politics, said it seems everyone has to be killed for a consensus to develop that it is genocide.
Rather than debate genocide without direct evidence, he argued, it would make sense to agree human rights violations are occurring and to act now before genocide can actually develop.
If only the world had followed that advice in Rwanda.
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